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Tag: media control

Molding the Message

In many countries, training the next generation of journalists means fostering the skills needed to go after the story and report in the public interest — serving the needs of the audience. In China, where media work is defined by the ruling Communist Party as essential to maintaining regime stability, journalism education takes a fundamentally different path. The profession exists not to hold power accountable, but to serve what Xi Jinping calls “the Party’s news and public opinion work” (党的新闻舆论工作).

That reality was on full display on October 11, 2025, when journalists, university representatives, and officials from the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Education, and the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA) convened in Beijing for the 2025 edition of the “China Journalism and Communication Forum” (中国新闻传播大讲堂). The ACJA, though ostensibly a “non-governmental organization,” in fact serves as an important layer of media control, regularly taking charge of training and licensing journalists to ensure compliance with the Party’s objectives.

Held every year running since 2020 — even through the years of Covid-19 lockdown, a sign of its critical nature — the journalism and communication forum serves as a key mechanism for synchronizing state media practices with academic training, ensuring that Party control over journalism flows seamlessly from classroom to newsroom. It functions as an annual training exercise, reinforcing the reporting frameworks that journalists and educators must follow to serve Party objectives. While the mandate to serve the Party has always been at the heart of media under the CCP, Xi Jinping has strongly reiterated the principle, telling media in February 2016 that they must be “surnamed Party” (必须姓党).

Marxist View of Journalism Definition
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Marxist View of Journalism
马克思主义新闻观
The “Marxist View of Journalism” is a shifting set of ideas that prescribe and justify the Chinese Communist Party’s dominance of the news media and application of controls on information. The concept defines journalism in China as fundamentally distinct from Western journalism, particularly rejecting the notion of the press as a fourth estate. At its core, it means that the CCP must and will control the media profession in order to maintain control over public opinion and maintain its hold on power. The concept is central to the training and licensing of journalists in China.

Since launching in 2020, the forum’s themes have consistently focused on news gathering standards and international communication — a crucial topic as China seeks to enhance its global media influence — and, since last year, the integration of artificial intelligence into journalism practice. Over the past six years, the forum has invited 199 news workers to deliver lectures, according to a read-out this week from the National Press and Publication Administration (NPPA), the official government press and publication regulator that is in fact the same body as the Party’s Propaganda Department. Successive forums have produced 192 long-form video courses and 500 short video courses that have, according to the NPPA, reached more than 200,000 journalism students and faculty at over 700 universities nationwide.

Held over the weekend at the Communication University of China (CUC), this year’s forum brought together 32 lead instructors from 22 news organizations, and was attended by representatives from 11 universities. But beyond skills-based capacity building, the focus is on fostering what the leadership calls the “Marxist View of Journalism” (马克思主义新闻观), which justifies CCP control of media to maintain social and political stability.

The theme of this year’s forum was not truth-telling, or how media can remain sustainable amid competition from digital platforms and social media, or any of the topics generally found at journalism-related events worldwide. It was “New Thought Leads the New Journey: Journalists’ Adherence to Principle and Innovation” (新思想引领新征程:记者的守正与创新). “Thought” in this context was a reference to “Xi Jinping Thought,” the ruling ideology of the country’s top leader. “Adherence to principle,” meanwhile, was about remaining true to Party orthodoxy. And “innovation”? This was simply the idea that media must adapt their methods and their models — even as they are, as ever, ideologically tethered to the Party.

Laying Down the Law

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has published its first comprehensive annual report on “internet rule of law development” (网络法治发展), signaling expanded digital control mechanisms for 2025 under the umbrella of what should be more accurately termed “rule by law.” The 278-page document references 2025 as the final year of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and promotes three separate legal frameworks for building “rule of law” (法治) in cyberspace — indicating the department may push harder to meet these converging deadlines.

“Explore uncharted territories,” reads the motto at DeepSeek. Authorities are making sure those territories are known and controlled.

The CAC explicitly cites “increasing diversity of opinions and groups” online — diversity in this case being a concern to be managed by a control-obsessed leadership — as justification for expanding operations. The report also acknowledges that new developments in artificial intelligence (AI) like the rise and expanding scope of DeepSeek’s popular model require careful management to balance “reform and rule of law, development and security.”

The CAC report focuses on the governance of AI, the body noting that domestic AI models have achieved breakthrough speeds — fondly referred to as “China speeds” (中国速度) — that have “swept the entire network” (席卷全网) and attracted global attention. In the report, officials describe a new phase of digitization driven by AI that transforms “production tools” (生产工具) and “production conditions” (生产条件), requiring updated regulatory frameworks. The administration plans to strengthen oversight of AI-generated content, algorithmic recommendations, and automated decision-making systems while promoting what it calls “beneficial” technological development.

Beyond domestic control, the CAC emphasizes China’s ambition to shape international cyberspace governance rules. The report calls for more assertive participation in global internet governance forums and bilateral negotiations on data flows, emerging technologies, and telecommunications services. Officials plan to leverage platforms like the World Internet Conference (WIC), held each year in Zhejiang, and China-Africa internet cooperation forums like the 2024 China-Africa Internet Development and Cooperation Forum to promote Chinese governance models internationally, while deepening enforcement cooperation with other nations on cross-border cybercrime and digital security issues.