Sinosphere

According to the German Federal Statistical Office, around 168,000 Chinese nationals resided in Germany as of 2025, representing 0.2 percent of the entire population. The community is concentrated in a handful of major cities, namely Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Munich. A stretch of the Kantstrasse in Berlin’s Charlottenburg, running roughly between Savignyplatz and Wilmersdorfer Strasse, holds the city’s densest concentration of East Asian restaurants and shops — dense enough that Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post once playfully dubbed it “Kantonstrasse,” a pun on the street’s name (which references the 19th century German philosopher). But the area is a restaurant strip only, far from an established Chinatown as one might find in London, Paris, or Amsterdam. 

The earliest recorded Chinese presence in Germany dates to 1821, when two seafarers from Guangdong Province, interested in Germany’s “Western ways,” arrived in Berlin. The community grew slowly through the late 19th and early 20th centuries, sustained largely by maritime workers and small traders driven by the increased demand for labor in Europe as a result of the Opium Wars. In the 1920s, a Chinatown emerged in Hamburg’s St. Pauli district, driven by Chinese sailors and traders attracted by economic opportunities. The neighborhood grew to a population of about 1,800 by 1935. 

The Kantstrasse in Charlottenburg has historical grounds for its association with Chinese life in Berlin. Most of the Chinese students who came to Berlin in the 1920s sublet rooms in apartments around the street, and Berlin’s first Chinese restaurant, the Tientsin, opened at Kantstrasse 130b in 1923, becoming a hub of political debate and community life. By 1927, over 500 Chinese students — nearly all from intellectual and more or less affluent families — were enrolled at the nearby Technische Hochschule, according to Dagmar Yu-Dembski, a Berlin-based scholar and author of several books on Sino-German relations. Germany’s universities more broadly drew reformists and revolutionaries during this period: Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培), who studied philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, and anthropology at the University of Leipzig from 1907 to 1911 before becoming the Republic of China’s first Minister of Education in 1912, was among those drawn to Germany’s intellectual environment. Individuals like Zhu De (朱德) and Zhang Bojun (章伯鈞), who would later become important figures in the Chinese Communist Party, became communists while studying in Germany in the 1920s, where Zhou Enlai was also involved with the Communist International.

Hamburg’s St. Pauli district was destroyed by Nazi persecution, including a 1944 raid that became known as the “Chinesenaktion,” when around 130 Chinese residents were arrested by the Gestapo. The community never recovered; its population remained below 5,000 until the 1980s, when new migrants found their way to Germany thanks to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1972, followed by the launch of China’s economic reforms in 1979. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number of students and workers from China came to Germany in search of opportunities, drawn by the country’s universities and its status as Europe’s largest economy, growing to over 63,000 by 2001. Most of Germany’s newer Chinese immigrants since the 1990s hail from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. The Chinese-language media landscape in the country is diverse, boasting Chinese state-owned media as well as independent outlets founded by the Chinese diaspora in Germany. WeChat has emerged as a primary platform for news, with many independent creators attempting to provide more nuanced information about German life and politics for Chinese speakers beyond state-sponsored outlets.

Climate and Challenges

Today, Germany maintains one of Europe’s strongest environments for press freedom, ranking 14th on Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) World Press Freedom Index in 2026, built on a diverse media landscape of public broadcasters, private outlets, and regional publications, and a robust legal framework. But that resilience has been tested in recent years by a sharp rise in physical attacks on journalists — RSF documented 89 such attacks in 2024, double the previous year — as well as ongoing controversy over surveillance laws that press freedom groups argue inadequately protect journalists from state monitoring.

Germany’s modern press freedom environment was forged in direct reaction to the totalitarian controls of the Nazi period, which ended in 1945 after twelve years of total state domination of information. Freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 5 of the postwar Basic Law — first implemented in West Germany in 1949 and assumed for the entire Federal Republic of Germany following unification in 1990 — protecting “the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures,” specifically in the press, broadcast, and films, and prohibiting censorship. However, these rights remain subject to the provisions of general laws. 

One of those laws that has been subject to scrutiny in recent years was also formed in relation to its Nazi past. Section 86a of Germany’s criminal code bans the dissemination of propaganda material of “unconstitutional” or “terrorist” political parties. While it does not name the specific parties, it has been used in Germany to ban pro-Nazi symbols and speech, though the law’s vague nature has caused legal controversy as to what constitutes an unconstitutional party or banned symbol. In 2026, a journalist was the subject of a police probe after he mocked the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in a podcast, referencing a Nazi slogan. German police and government agencies have also been criticized by groups, including the UN, for using such laws to suppress “legitimate Palestinian solidarity activism.” Since 2023, Middle East-related protests in Germany have been the site of numerous attacks on and obstruction of journalists by individuals, both by police and protesters: in 2024, RSF documented 89 attacks on journalists, 75 of which involved direct physical violence, and many of which took place on the sidelines of these demonstrations.

Journalists have also faced threats, harassment, obstruction, and physical violence while covering far-right movements like PEGIDA, or “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West,” a far-right street movement that began holding weekly rallies in Dresden in 2014, and the AfD, a far-right party that became the second-largest force in the German parliament in the 2025 federal election. The rise of these groups has also played a role in stoking hostility toward mainstream media, crystallized in the chant Lügenpresse — “lying press.” About 45 percent of Germans trust the news, according to the Reuters Institute, a notable decline since the pandemic (53 percent in 2021). 

European and German press groups have also expressed concern about amendments made to Germany’s Federal Constitution Protection Act in 2021, which allows federal police to monitor online activity and encrypted communications in the context of terrorism-related investigations. Mogens Blicher Bjerregård, President of the European Federation of Journalists, said that the law “would not only violate press freedom but could be counterproductive for its own purpose having a negative impact on investigative journalism.” Germany’s BND Act, which enables Germany’s foreign intelligence service to monitor journalists’ communications, has also been controversial. 
Finally, Germany has become fertile ground for transnational repression (TNR)  of Chinese journalists and activists, according to a 2025 report from the Germany-based Friedrich Naumann Foundation. The report details several recent TNR cases — including that of Su Yutong, a Chinese journalist and human rights activist who has been the subject of “near-constant” physical, digital, and psychological harassment since moving to Germany in 2010 — and states that “Germany risks becoming a permissive environment for authoritarian interference” should it not address the gaps in its policies toward transnational repression. Overseas Chinese police stations that monitor and target the Chinese diaspora have also been identified in Germany.

Domestic Chinese Media

Germany’s lively Chinese diaspora community is host to its own ecosystem of independent, outspoken outlets as well as media with party-state connections and Chinese-language services from German domestic media outlets. Many of these outlets, initially founded independently by the Chinese diaspora in Germany, now see a challenge to their independence due to their growing engagement and partnerships with Chinese official media and party-state entities.

Deutsche Welle, Germany’s government-funded international-facing radio broadcaster, has been providing news coverage to Mandarin-speaking audiences since 1965 and now covers a wide array of global news, politics, and culture.

The Chinesische Handelszeitung (華商報) is among the oldest and most well-known Chinese newspapers still in operation in Germany, founded in 1997 as a “neutral, informative,” and “current” bi-weekly Chinese trade journal with a circulation of 20,000 in 2016. It was founded and edited by German-Chinese journalists Xiu Haitao (修海濤) and Xu Bin (徐彬). Xiu was a lecturer at the CCP’s Central Party School before he came to Germany on a scholarly exchange arranged after diplomatic talks between the two countries in 1986. He remained in Germany as a result of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, and became involved in the Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), an overseas pro-democracy and human rights movement, under the pen name Qi Mo, according to an obituary written by his friends. In a 2005 interview, Xiu told Deutsche Welle that Chinesische Handelszeitung’s stance “may not be the same as China’s view. We have a relatively detached position and have our own opinions.” However, his obituary noted that Xiu’s views had “drifted further and further away from the original intentions of the pro-democracy movement.”

Xiu edited the paper until his retirement in 2021, when it was sold to a Germany-based company called Golden Way GmbH, and journalist Cao Qing (曹晴) became editor-in-chief. Its former website  (deouhuashang.de) appears to have gone offline as of late 2024, and its former WeChat account (德國華商) was dormant as of 2025. In April 2025, it rebranded as 德歐知德 on a WeChat account owned by the Hangzhou Xiangxi Technology Development Corporation (杭州香溪科技發展有限公司), though it still appears to conduct activities and publish under the Chinesische Handelszeitung name. Today, the outlet is a member of at least two Chinese media associations with ties to the Chinese state and publishes op-eds by Chinese consular officials. 

Chinese in Deutschland (德國僑報), founded in 2006 and initially called European United Weekly (歐洲聯合週報), is published by Nouvelles D’Europe, Shanghai’s state-run Xinmin Evening News (新民晚報) — which was consolidated in 2025 into the Shangguan News (上觀新聞) platform — and Germany’s New World Media Group (德國新天地傳媒集團). It is a bi-weekly tabloid newspaper that does not appear to have its own operating website or WeChat account as of 2026. It belongs to the Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations of Germany (全德華僑華人聯合總會), an association supported by the Chinese consulate in Germany that was established in 1998 with the aim of both serving the Chinese community and promoting China’s image and policies in the country.

Perhaps the most significant Chinese media currently operating in Germany in terms of regional scale is the Germany-focused edition of the Paris-based Nouvelles D’Europe (歐洲時報), or European Times, initially a France-based Chinese newspaper founded in 1983 that now sells its daily papers across all of Europe. In addition to its website and social media channels, it also engages in film and television production, book publishing, and e-commerce. According to its website, Nouvelles D’Europe’s cooperating partners include the Chinese embassy in Germany as well as state media outlets, including Xinhua, People’s Daily, China Daily, CCTV, and more. An investigation by the now-shuttered Hong Kong diaspora media outlet Flow HK (如水) found that Nouvelles d’Europe is controlled by a Hong Kong-registered company, Ya Zhou Wen Hua Enterprises, Ltd (亞洲文化企業有限公司), whose shareholders and directors include figures connected to the CCP’s United Front Work Department. The investigation also found that the outlet’s associated cultural centers receive funding from Confucius Institutes, global Chinese language institutes operated under China’s Ministry of Education. In 2023, Wu Ken (吴恳), China’s ambassador to Germany, gave an interview to Nouvelles D’Europe in which he called on young overseas Chinese in Germany to serve as “people’s ambassadors” in order to advance mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries.

In the digital news space, there is the news aggregation website Kaiyuan Network (開元網), originally established in 2002 as a forum for Chinese students in Germany. It began offering tourism services in 2006 as Kaiyuan Tourism (开元周游) and in 2015 partnered with the People’s Daily Overseas Network (人民日报海外網) to launch its first European edition. The platform now operates multiple social media channels, including WeChat official accounts, a forum, Weibo, and TikTok, positioning itself as a central Chinese-language travel and information platform in Europe.

New Broad (歐洲新橋網) is a publication of the Sino-German Tourism, Culture and Media Exchange Association (德中旅遊文化傳媒交流協會), a nonprofit founded in Germany in 2007 with close ties to Chinese state entities whose expressed aim is to “promote cultural and media exchanges between China and Germany, enhance mutual understanding between the two countries’ political, economic, and cultural spheres, and strive to act as a bridge between the governments and media communities of both countries.” Its editors participate in overseas Chinese media delegations organized by party-affiliated bodies, including a 2024 trip to Shanghai’s Songjiang district organized by the China Overseas Chinese Federation (中國僑聯), during which New Broad’s editor-in-chief pledged to “build a bridge between the German diaspora and the motherland’s development.” The outlet has also published op-eds written by consular officials and run jointly in other Chinese-language media outlets in Germany. The President of the Sino-German Tourism, Culture and Media Exchange Association and director of New Broad, Wu Zhifen (吴志芬), is also a co-creator of a digital news aggregation platform called Tide News (潮新聞), an initiative launched in 2023 by the state-run Zhejiang Daily Group (浙江日报报业集团) and guided by the propaganda office of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the CCP. Wu said the platform will allow overseas Chinese in Germany to “better understand Zhejiang.”

Beyond media outlets, Chinese students studying in Germany have established dedicated online communities to share information and mutual support. One such platform is ABCDV, which has become the authoritative guide for Chinese students, covering German language learning, university applications, housing, insurance, and navigating daily life. A diverse array of innovative independent publications has also emerged from the German-Chinese diaspora community, such as ZhongDe Magazine, an online magazine founded in 2021 that provides “a freer space for diverse expression, networking, and education.” The print-digital diaspora magazine Mang Mang (莽莽), founded in Berlin in 2023, was created in the wake of the White Paper protest movement and bills itself as “an independent, uncensored Chinese magazine” (一本不受審查德中文獨立雜誌). It covers topics such as women’s rights, gender, democracy, identity, activism, Taiwan, and queer issues, and aims to build stronger networks across China, Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. Tofu Stand, based in Berlin, provides a platform for self-published activism-oriented physical media from Asia.

Lines of PRC Impact and Engagement

Deep economic ties in sectors such as the automotive industry have created inroads for Chinese media cooperation in Germany. China has also developed close ties with German domestic outlets through familiar tactics such as media sharing agreements, forums, and op-eds penned by Chinese diplomatic officials, though not all media cooperation attempts have been warmly received in Germany.

Soft Ties And Symphaties

China was Germany’s largest trading partner for eight consecutive years from 2016 to 2023, a position it briefly ceded to the United States in 2024 before reclaiming it in 2025. The most important sector for cooperation by far has been automotives, where Germany historically had a strong advantage: in 2021, German manufacturers sold around 4.3 million cars in China. But the growing dominance of Chinese electric cars internationally and in Europe has exacerbated the trade deficit between the two countries, reaching a record high in 2025. This increasing competition — combined with worsening opinions in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic and the Russia-Ukraine war — has driven domestic skepticism toward China, and shaped public opinion of China as an economic threat rather than an opportunity.

Entanglements in the automotive industry, however, have led to media cooperation opportunities. The annual Media Forum China-Germany (中德媒體論壇), hosted by the Party tabloid the Global Times (環球時報), was co-organized from 2010 until at least 2016 by the Robert Bosch Foundation. The charitable organization owns 94% of shares in Robert Bosch GmbH, the largest automotive supplier in the world, which employs tens of thousands of people across its 63 subsidiaries in China and has invested nearly USD $7 billion in the country over the past decade. The 2016 forum brought together editors-in-chief from German newspapers and Chinese state media professionals, including then-editor-in-chief Hu Xijin of the Global Times, to discuss the countries’ shared challenges, visit mosques in Xi’an, and test drive electric cars. The event faced criticism in recent years from activists who argue that the Forum allows Chinese state-controlled media representatives to promote official Chinese narratives.

Hard Approaches

The PRC has also been expanding its efforts to reach a broader audience through the German language through various channels. 

The first is by making official Chinese media programming available in the German language, as in the example of the German editions of the Beijing Review (Beijing Rundschau), a foreign-facing magazine operated by the Central Propaganda Department. The Chinese corporation Deutsch-Chinesisch Medien (北京華韻尚德國際文化傳播有限公司) has received high praise in official CCP media for its German-language series “Lai kan ba” (來看吧), a 30-minute daily short documentary program about Chinese life and society that broadcast to millions of viewers on German television channels until at least 2020. 

China has also sought to build stronger partnerships through bilateral forums. China Media Group (中央廣播電視總台), China’s primary foreign-facing television and radio broadcaster that falls under the direct leadership of the Central Propaganda Department, celebrated the 52nd anniversary of China-Germany diplomatic relations and the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the all-round strategic partnership in 2024 by hosting an exchange event for approximately 100 attendees, including CMG’s vice president, representatives from the Chinese Embassy, and officials from the Bavarian State Ministry of Economic Affairs, Energy and Technology. During the event, Germany’s Vogel Communications Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding with CMG Europe, which, according to Vogel’s announcement, included plans for journalist exchange programs to China.

Chinese-German media collaborations have a history of sparking controversy domestically. In August and September 2014, the director general of the German state-funded television broadcaster Deutsche Welle announced cooperation agreements with China Central Television (中央電視台), the Chinese state television broadcaster, including on co-productions in music and business programming. Just months later, in early 2015, Deutsche Welle announced it would temporarily suspend the partnership after it came under scrutiny from the German Bundestag, according to testimony given by journalist Su Yutong (蘇雨桐) before a hearing of the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China in 2016. Su’s CECC testimony alleged that Deutsche Welle had softened the stance of the network’s Chinese-language coverage on China after a meeting between the Chinese Ambassador to Germany and Deutsche Welle. The announced 2014 cooperation between Deutsche Welle and CCTV also drew intense criticism at the time from Reporters Without Borders Germany, which called the cooperation “incompatible” with DW’s mission, noting CCTV’s role in China’s “repressive apparatus” against journalists. 

The proposed CCTV cooperation also came around the same time that Su, who had been working for Deutsche Welle since 2010, was told that her contract would not be renewed the following year. According to the International Federation of Journalists, the incident centered around an article published by a Beijing-based media consultant, Frank Sieren, who argued that some Western media outlets were unfairly critical of China regarding the incident. Su’s layoff also came a day after a protest outside of the outlet’s Bonn headquarters led by former Tiananmen activist Wu’er Kaixi (吾爾開希). 

But cooperation between Chinese and German media groups has continued despite the controversy, accelerating particularly in the past few years.

In November 2024, China Media Group and Berliner Zeitung launched a joint column, “China Perspective,” featuring articles by CMG reporters that promote China’s official narrative on topics ranging from electric vehicles to commercial aviation. The cooperation was formalized in October 2024 following meetings between representatives from Berliner Verlag, Berliner Zeitung’s publisher, and a high-level CMG delegation in Berlin. CMG frames this collaboration as providing Germans with “a new channel to understand China.”

German media outlets have also published several articles penned by Chinese consular officials and ambassadors in recent years, including in Berliner Zeitung, Handelsblatt, Table.Media, and more, on topics ranging from the promotion of German investment in China to criticisms of alleged Western support for “Taiwan independence.” In 2017, Xi Jinping published a signed article titled “To Make the World a Better Place” in the German newspaper Die Welt ahead of his state visit to Germany and attendance at the G20 Hamburg Summit.

For examples of the various forms of cooperation and engagement between China and German media and media-related organizations, see our Activity Reports for Germany.