Sinosphere

Ethnic Chinese in Laos, numbering approximately 300,000 according to population statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce in 2024, constitute roughly four percent of the country’s total population of 7.76 million. Unlike the substantial Chinese communities in a number of other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, the Chinese population in Laos is relatively small. Most Laotian Chinese (老撾華人) are descendants of migrants from southern Chinese provinces, including Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan and Guizhou who arrived from the 19th century onward.

Despite their small numbers, the Chinese community plays an outsized role in the economy of Laos, and there has been a strong flow of investors and business owners from China in recent years. According to a 2023 report by Radio Free Asia, an estimated 7,500 PRC citizens have settled in Laos since around 2018-2019, many following the opportunities opened up by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has brought a 5.9 billion dollar high-speed rail project and a number of dam projects to the country but has also raised its external debt.

Mandarin has increasingly become an important language of business as families have encouraged children to learn Chinese to strengthen economic ties with the wealthy neighbor. Unlike the diverse Chinese-language media landscapes found elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the tightly controlled media environment in Laos offers limited space for independent Chinese-language publications, with state media predominating across 24 newspapers and broadcasting outlets under government supervision, all closely following the line of the Peoples’ Propaganda Commissariat.

Climate & Challenges 

Journalism and media in Laos operate within one of the most restrictive environments in Southeast Asia, where the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) maintains near-total control over information flows. In 2025, Laos improved slightly to 150th out of 180 countries in the global index maintained by the Reporters Without Borders (RSF), moving up three spots from 153. However, this did not reflect any real advancement, and the press group continues to characterize the country as “an information ‘black hole’ from which little reliable information emerges.”

The legal framework governing media in Laos involves multiple layers of restriction and censorship. The 2003 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression under Article 44, but Article 23 effectively nullifies this protection by granting the state ultimate authority over press activities “for the purpose of national protection and development” while prohibiting “mass media activities which are detrimental to national interests or the fine traditional culture and dignity of Lao people.” More specifically, Article 65 of the 2005 Penal Law imposes criminal penalties of up to five years imprisonment for anyone circulating information ” conducting propaganda activities against and slandering the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.”

Lao citizens have the right and freedom of speech, press and assembly; and have the right to set up associations and to stage demonstrations which are not contrary to the laws. — Article 44, Constitution of Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

Digital spaces face even stricter controls through Decree No. 327 on internet information management, enacted in September 2014. This legislation criminalizes publishing “untrue information” about the policies of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party or the Lao government for the purpose of “undermining … the country.” The decree requires all social media users to register with their real names, and empowers authorities to prosecute anyone sharing content deemed to create social disorder or “divide solidarity among ethnic groups.” A 2015 presidential decree further mandated that foreign journalists submit their reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before publication or broadcast, effectively establishing prior censorship for international media.

The government’s information monopoly includes 24 newspapers, 32 television networks and 44 radio stations required. All are required to follow the party line dictated by the Peoples’ Propaganda Commissariat. State-controlled outlets like Lao News Agency (Kaosan Pathet Lao), the newspaper Vientiane Mai, and the online outlet and paper Pasaxon disseminate official party news and propaganda — much like China’s People’s Daily — while the English-language Vientiane Times targets foreign audiences under the oversight of the Ministry of Information and Culture. A substantial proportion of the population in Laos continues to rely on radio broadcasts as their primary source of information, and Lao National Radio is broadly accessible, particularly in rural areas where print media and television are less available. The environment of strict control, and the severe repercussions of speaking out, have naturally encouraged self-censorship among Lao journalists, and RSF notes in its profile of the country that many journalists for this reason parrot releases from the official news agency.

Recent developments indicate a continuous evolution in Laos’s media restrictions. The government has intensified surveillance of social media users, particularly targeting influential Facebook users pejoratively labeled “net idols” who command large followings. In 2019, blogger Houayheuang Xayabouly, known as “Mouay,” received a five-year prison sentence for posting videos criticizing the government’s response to serious flooding.

Despite the restrictive environment, however, younger Laotians increasingly seek alternative information sources, particularly through Thai social media due to linguistic similarities between Lao and Thai. In 2020, a rare online protest movement emerged with the hashtag #IfLaoPoliticsWasGood. The protest movement briefly denounced the lack of freedom of expression in Laos before coming under suppression by the authorities. In a report in April 2024, Rappler, an online news outlet from the Philippines, noted that social media channels for news and information were on the rise among Lao audiences, despite state media controls.

Domestic Chinese-Language Outlets

Owing to both strict state controls on the media and the relatively small size of the Chinese population, the Chinese-language media landscape in Laos is considerably less developed than in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. Just a handful of outlets serve the local Chinese diaspora and business community.

The longest-standing Chinese-language publication is the Chinese Times (中華時報), operated by the Lao Chinese Chamber of Commerce under its president, Wu Xinghua (吳興華), who frequently appears as a voice of business in Laos in the Chinese state media and seems closely aligned with PRC diplomatic objectives. The newspaper has its origins in an earlier publication called the Lao Chinese News (老撾中文報) founded in 2013 by Yao Bin (姚賓), executive president of the Lao Chinese Chamber of Commerce, which primarily featured community news and commercial information but was not officially registered with Laos’s Ministry of Information and Culture, meaning it operated without official media licensing as an informal community newsletter rather than a legally recognized newspaper. The current iteration covers domestic Laotian news, economics, culture, tourism, education, and updates on China-Laos collaboration affecting the local Chinese population.

A separate announcement was made in 2018 during the first Belt and Road Forum for Laos-China Cooperation regarding the creation of what was described as the Chinese Daily (中華日報). This publication was officially launched with claims of being “Laos’s first Chinese-language overseas Chinese newspaper” (老挝首家华文侨报) that would “end the history of Laos having no Chinese-language newspaper.” However, the relationship between this announced publication and the existing Chinese Times remains unclear, as both appear to involve the same individuals and organizations. According to Yao Bin, the publication would “aim to bridge communication between the Lao government and the Chinese diaspora,” facilitating their participation in economic and social development while promoting bilateral cooperation.

In the digital media space, several platforms have emerged to serve the Chinese community’s information needs. The Laos Information Network (老撾資訊網) was founded in Vientiane in 2012 by Long Pan (龍攀), a native of Hunan, China, who identified the information gap facing Chinese businessmen in Laos. The platform is operated by Laos Future Media Co., Ltd. with technological support from Shenzhen Wangce Technology Co., Ltd., and delivers news, policy updates, and business information through both WeChat and print media channels. The company also operates 58Lao.com and published the quarterly Laos Business Information magazine from 2013-2017. Additionally, Laowotong (老撾通), launched as a WeChat account in 2014, distinguishes itself by offering not only news updates but also practical services including mobile phone recharging, online shopping, hotel reservations, and visa processing through its dedicated app and forum website. Laowotong has approximately 360,000 subscribers, making it the most subscribed Chinese-language WeChat platform in Laos.

China has expanded its media engagement in Laos through formal partnerships and state media operations. At the 2018 Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Media Summit, the overseas edition of China’s People’s Daily (人民日報海外版) signed a collaboration agreement with the Chinese Times (中華時報), which the newspaper described as significantly contributing to creating “an important international brand” and enhancing its status as a notable media outlet both domestically and internationally. In June 2020, the Chinese Times (中華時報) partnered with Xinhua’s Economic Information Agency to produce a bilingual Lao-English column called “Xinhua Silk Road” (新華絲路).

Chinese state media also maintains a significant and longstanding presence through China Radio International (CRI) — brought under the CCP’s China Media Group (CMG) in 2018 — and its local Vientiane Studio (CRI-FM93), which first began broadcasting in the country in 2006. The radio station offers diverse programming including news and entertainment content, serving as one of the most important information sources about China for Laotian audiences. According to research by Outhaylath Vithay (欧阳泰) published in 2021, CRI-FM93’s Facebook page had approximately 1.39 million followers, making it the most popular media account in Laos and the second most popular Facebook page overall in the country, with nearly half of Laos’s Facebook users following the account. The station has also produced Chinese propaganda content, including videos promoting Xi Jinping’s youth activities and documentaries such as “The Other Side of Hong Kong” that portrayed 2019 Hong Kong protesters as “rioters and terrorists.” This demonstrates both the significant reach of Chinese-language content in the country’s media landscape and CRI’s particular role in a country where radio still plays an important part in media consumption.

Lines of PRC Impact & Engagement

Given Laos’s strong dependence on the People’s Republic of China economically, and the two countries’ shared ideological foundations as one-party socialist states, it is not a surprise to find clear instances of alignment between many positions in Lao media and those in Chinese state media. Laos has become China’s largest investment destination in mainland Southeast Asia, with Chinese companies investing over $13 billion since 1989, though investments have also driven local resentment over uneven sharing of the benefits of growing involvement. China is positioned to become the country’s top trading partner, a fact that creates deep economic entanglements that impact media coverage and give China a vested interest in driving narratives about the relationship.

The highly controlled nature of the media environment in Laos, touched on previously, provides a fertile ground for Chinese state influence of the media. There are also more direct instances of PRC engagement with Lao media both through diplomatic missions and exchanges with Chinese state media. Only the Chinese government’s official Xinhua News Agency (新華社) and its Vietnamese counterpart have been permitted to date to open bureaus in the capital of Vientiane. The Chinese Embassy, meanwhile, facilitates active media and cultural cooperation, with these events focussed on media support for bilateral cooperation.

Soft Ties and Sympathies

Over the past three decades, leaders from the Chinese diaspora community in Laos, known as the qiaoling (侨领), have become instrumental in exercising broader political control over members of the community in exchange for economic and trade benefits offered by the PRC government, in what one scholar who has done related fieldwork in Laos refers to as “a co-optive governing approach.”

The influence of this diasporic elites has become especially pronounced given China’s massive and growing economic footprint in the country. Domestic media, including Chinese-language media have been entirely uncritical in the face of questionable investments, including the 5.9 billion dollar high-speed rail project whose cost was equivalent to one-third of 2022 GDP. The project has contributed to crushing debt in Laos. In lieu of criticism, media outlets have widely praised such projects and investments as underscoring the benefits of China-Laos friendship.

Hard Approaches

Beyond economic influence, China has cultivated increasingly close relationships with media in Laos. Four basic approaches emerge from these engagements, as follows:

Direct Diplomatic Engagement: Chinese embassy and consulate officials maintain regular contact with Laotian media organizations, facilitating cooperation agreements and content sharing arrangements. This includes organizing high-level meetings between Chinese and Lao media executives and coordinating joint coverage of bilateral events and initiatives.

In August 2017, Li Baoguang (黎宝光), China’s consul general in Luang Prabang, met with a delegation led by Laotian Deputy Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism Savankhone Lanmongdy (沙万坤·兰蒙迪) and discussed strengthening cooperation between China and the six provinces of northern Laos in the media, culture and tourism sectors. Both sides emphasized the role of such exchanges in strengthening bilateral exchanges. Less than two years later, in January 2019, China’s ambassador to Laos, Jiang Zaidong (姜再冬), embarked on an outreach tour during which he visited the Lao China Cultural Center, the Laos station of China Radio International (CRI), and Xinhua’s Vientiane bureau to hold discussions on strengthening China-Laos cultural and media cooperation.

Training Programs and Forums: China organizes media participation through regional forums such as the Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Media Summit (澜沧江—湄公河合作媒体峰会), regularly hosted by the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper with support from the Central Propaganda Department. Chinese officials also conduct various training sessions (培訓班) for Laotian media personnel, including the 2019 event, “Training for press officials and journalists from Lancang-Mekong countries” (澜湄国家新闻官员及媒体记者培训).

These training programs represent a targeted approach to media influence, offering all-expense-paid reporting trips to China featuring stays at four-star hotels and comprehensive cultural immersion experiences designed to foster positive coverage of Chinese initiatives. According to local media experts, China’s strategy specifically targets individual journalists for skills training while cultivating positive impressions of China, in contrast to media assistance from other international partners that typically focuses on journalism skills building and institutional development — on example in the region being the “Mekong Data Journalism Fellowship.”

Content Cooperation and Programming: Chinese television content has achieved significant penetration in Laotian programming. MV Lao Television, founded by Xu Lina (徐丽娜)—niece of former Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat Lengsavad and described as a “China expert”—reports that approximately 65 percent of its programming originates from China, attracting millions of viewers.
Cloud Digital Media (云数传媒), through its joint venture with Lao National Television, has systematically acquired 2,278 episodes of Chinese programming for local distribution. Since 2014, Guangxi People’s Broadcasting Station has collaborated with Lao National Television on programs like “Chinese Theater” (中国剧场) and “Chinese Animation” (中国动漫), broadcasting jointly-produced Chinese films and animation weekly.

China Radio International’s CRI-FM93 has achieved some degree of market penetration with 1.6 million followers on its Facebook account, labelled as belonging to the state-run China Media Group (CMG). This represents nearly half of the Facebook user base in Laos, though it is unclear how many of these users are in-country. Since March 2020, CRI-FM93 began producing 5-10 minute Lao-language news videos featuring Chinese leadership activities, foreign policy positions, and domestic policies, including content defending Beijing’s positions on Hong Kong protests, which were characterized as causing “chaos and violence”.

Infrastructure Investment and Technology Transfer: China’s media infrastructure investments have significantly expanded Laos’s broadcasting capabilities through technology transfers and institutional partnerships. Launched in 2015, the “Laosat-1” satellite from a Chinese satellite center in Sichuan enabled comprehensive satellite TV coverage across Laos with a 130-channel system including 6 local Lao channels, 55 Chinese channels (including CCTV4 and CCTV9), and 69 other international language channels. Chinese funding of more than 11 billion kip, or roughly 550,000 dollars, backed the setup of the Lao People’s Army Television in September 2020, which Lao Deputy Prime Minister Chansamone Chanyalath (占沙蒙•占雅拉) described as “a special gift to the Lao army, government and people.”

Digital platform penetration represents another critical vector of influence. While Facebook dominates Laos’s social media landscape, with 4.25 million users representing 54.3 percent of the population as of 2025, Chinese platforms including WeChat, TikTok, and Weibo are gaining significant traction. In January 2016, WeChat’s voice calling service was expanded to include Laos alongside other regional markets, while Chinese social media platforms have grown particularly among younger demographics and the expanding Chinese diaspora community. Additionally, China has provided substantial support for Laos’s internet infrastructure, including a $20 million loan to build internet infrastructure and provide training for the Lao National Internet Center (LANIC).

China’s impact on the media and information landscape in Laos has been aided by a regulatory environment favoring Chinese media operations while restricting competitors. 2016 amendments to the 2008 Media Law and November 2015 Decree No. 377 require foreign media organizations to submit content for government approval before publication, effectively limiting media operations to those willing to comply with content restrictions. Only China’s Xinhua News Agency and Vietnam’s official government-run VNA have successfully navigated these requirements to establish bureau operations in Vientiane. Additionally, 2019 regulations mandate that all social media news platforms register with authorities or face imprisonment and substantial fines, creating additional barriers for independent media while preserving space for state-approved Chinese outlets.

For examples of various forms of cooperation and engagement between China and Laotian media organizations, see our Activity Reports for Laos.