Jishi Media (吉視傳媒) is a Chinese state-controlled cable television operator founded in May 2001 and headquartered in Changchun, the capital of China’s northeast Jilin province. The state-run Jilin Radio and TV Station (吉林廣播電視台) is its largest shareholder and controlling entity, holding a direct 28.18 percent stake according to registration records as of May 2026 — and being the ultimate shareholder of a majority of the other minor shareholders in the entity. The company manages and maintains the province’s cable television infrastructure, serving 5.19 million subscribers with cable TV, broadband internet, and digital television services, including on-demand and interactive content. It operates 60 subsidiaries and branch offices across Jilin province, Beijing, and Hainan, employs more than 7,000 people, and has built a fiber-optic network spanning 61,000 kilometers across the province. In February 2012, Jishi Media listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange under the ticker 601929.
The Jilin Provincial People’s Government is the state administrative and executive organ of Jilin Province in northeastern China, headquartered in Changchun. Established in 1949 alongside the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it formally reports to the State Council in Beijing and to the Jilin Provincial People’s Congress, though in practice authority rests with the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Naftemporiki (Η Ναυτεμπορική) is a daily financial newspaper founded in Greece on March 8, 1924, by pioneering Greek journalists Panos and Giorgos Athanasiadis. The paper covers the Greek economy, capital markets, corporate news, shipping, ports, and energy policy. The paper also convenes the Naftemporiki Economic Conference and the Diamonds of the Greek Economy business awards, the latter being an annual event for top-performing Greek brands that generally gathers together Greek ministers and corporate executives. The paper reposts content in Greek from The Economist and other Western media, including coverage of China.
The Consulate General of Malaysia in Guangzhou (馬來西亞駐廣州總領事館) is a diplomatic mission of the Malaysian government, operating under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia (Kementerian Luar Negeri Malaysia). It is one of seven Malaysian diplomatic representations in China, alongside the embassy in Beijing and consulates in Hong Kong, Kunming, Nanning, Shanghai, and Xi’an. The consulate general’s jurisdiction covers five provinces: Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Hainan, and Hunan. It provides consular services to Malaysian citizens in the region and handles visa applications from Chinese nationals seeking to enter Malaysia. In addition to standard consular functions, the mission maintains a commercial section responsible for promoting bilateral trade and investment between Malaysia and China.
Jilin Radio and Television Station is a provincial-level state broadcaster based in Changchun, the capital of China’s northeast Jilin province. It was formed on October 31, 2018 through the merger of two older state outlets — Jilin People’s Broadcasting Station (吉林人民广播電台) and Jilin Television (吉林電視台) — under the Jilin Province Institutional Reform Plan, approved by the Party Central Committee and State Council. JLRTV runs eight radio frequencies covering a range of formats including news, traffic, music, and rural programming, as well as seven television channels, among them Jilin Satellite Television, which is distributed nationally across China. The station is directly owned by the Jilin Provincial People’s Government, and its content is supervised by the Propaganda Office of the Jilin Provincial Communist Party Committee.
On April 3, 2023, Du Xiaohui (杜曉暉), China’s ambassador to Zambia, published a signed op-ed titled “Zambia Should Be a Stage for All Countries’ Cooperation in Africa, Not a Competition Arena” (贊比亞應是各國對非合作大舞台，而非競技場) in three Zambian outlets: the Zambia Daily Mail, the Daily Nation, and The Mast. The article was timed to coincide with the completion of the Lower Kafue Gorge 750-megawatt hydropower station and used it as the centerpiece for a broader argument about the character of China’s engagement with Zambia. Du framed the project as evidence of China’s adherence to the principles of “mutual benefit and win-win” (互利共赢) and “open and inclusive” (開放包容) cooperation, invoking the friendship between the two countries as “as firm and enduring as the TAZARA railway.” The article directly pushed back against what it characterized as “unwarranted accusations” from “unfriendly countries” during the project’s construction. It argued that Zambia and Africa should be a “great stage” (大舞台) for the cooperation of all countries rather than a “competitive arena” (競技場), a standard CCP formulation that positions its engagements as selfless acts showing generosity in particular towards countries in the Global South. The piece invoked the concept of a “development deficit” (發展赤字) as the framing problem China’s engagement purports to solve.
On September 25, 2024, the governments of China and Zambia jointly hosted the High-Level Meeting on International Cooperation on Capacity-Building of Artificial Intelligence (人工智能能力建設國際合作高級別會議) on the margins of the general debate of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) attended and addressed the event alongside Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Zambia’s Minister of Technology and Science Felix Mutati, and UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, with high-level representatives from more than 80 countries and international organizations participating. The meeting was convened as a follow-up to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/78/311 on “Enhancing International Cooperation on Capacity-Building of Artificial Intelligence” (關於加強人工智能能力建設國際合作的決議), which China had tabled and which passed by consensus in July 2024 with 143 co-sponsoring states. In his remarks, titled “Promoting Development for All and Bridging the AI Divide,” Wang announced China’s AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All (人工智能能力建設行動計劃), a ten-point program organized around five areas: AI and digital infrastructure connectivity; model development and application cooperation; talent development and AI literacy; data construction and security governance; and AI safety and controllability. Wang also promoted Xi Jinping’s Global AI Governance Initiative (全球人工智能治理倡議), first proposed in October 2023, as the normative framework for international AI cooperation, framing it as a multilateralist alternative to what he characterized as hegemonic governance — specifically rejecting “using a single set of values as the sole standard for AI governance.” He proposed that China and Zambia co-establish a Group of Friends for International Cooperation on AI Capacity-Building (人工智能能力建設國際合作之友小組) at the United Nations to advance implementation of the resolution and the action plan. In CCP diplomatic discourse, “friendship” generally carries political expectations of accommodation of China’s core interests.
On December 3, 2024, China and Zambia co-hosted the inaugural meeting of the Group of Friends for International Cooperation on AI Capacity-Building (人工智能能力建設國際合作之友小組) at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, formally establishing the group. Fu Cong (傅聰), China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Prudence Kaoma, acting Permanent Secretary of Zambia’s Ministry of Finance and National Planning, delivered opening remarks, with representatives from more than 80 countries and several UN agencies attending, including the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology. The group was established as a direct follow-up mechanism to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/78/311 (關於加強人工智能能力建設國際合作的決議) and to China’s AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All (人工智能能力建設行動計劃), announced at the September 2024 UN General Assembly high-level meeting. According to China’s Permanent Mission to the UN, Fu invoked Xi Jinping’s Global AI Governance Initiative (全球人工智能治理倡議) as the normative foundation for the group’s work, framing it around “fairness and inclusiveness” and “multilateralism” — terms China uses in AI governance contexts to promote state-centered regulatory frameworks as an alternative to norms that emphasize individual rights or Western institutional leadership. Kaoma said Zambia expected the group to bridge the AI divide and support the UN’s role in global AI governance. According to the People’s Daily, the meeting marked China’s second major AI governance event at the UN in three months.
On April 28, 2026, Zambia’s state-owned media announced the postponement of RightsCon 2026, the world’s largest digital human rights conference, which had been scheduled to take place at the Mulungushi Conference Center in Lusaka from May 5–8. The cancellation came after the Chinese Embassy in Zambia pressured the Government of Zambia over the planned participation of Taiwanese civil society at the event. According to Access Now, the New York-based organizer, Zambia’s Ministry of Technology and Science communicated on April 27 that Chinese diplomats were objecting to Taiwanese participants, and that — through multiple informal sources — the government’s condition for allowing the event to proceed was that Access Now moderate specific topics and exclude Taiwanese participants from both in-person and online participation. Access Now described this as a “red line” and cancelled the event on April 29 after receiving a formal postponement letter from the Ministry of Information and Media. The Zambian government’s stated rationale was the need to ensure “alignment with Zambia’s national values.” The Mulungushi Conference Center, the planned venue, had been refurbished in 2020 with approximately 60 million US dollars in Chinese government funding, which Zambian authorities at the time described as a “gift from China.” Three days before the postponement announcement, China’s Ambassador Han Jing (韓鏡) and Zambia’s Minister of Finance signed a development cooperation agreement. The planned conference had included panels on China’s export of digital authoritarianism, disinformation in Africa, and Chinese surveillance and censorship technologies. Amnesty International described the cancellation as “a brazen act of Chinese transnational repression.” Article 19’s Michael Caster argued that the incident was “emblematic of China’s broader efforts to influence global digital norms-setting” through a state-centric model of cyber sovereignty. Human Rights Watch senior Africa researcher Idriss Ali Nassah said the Zambian government’s stated reasons were “flimsy.” The Net Rights Coalition and more than 130 digital rights stakeholders condemned the cancellation, citing concerns about civic space ahead of Zambia’s August 2026 elections. NYU’s Stern Center for Business and Human Rights noted the broader context of Chinese surveillance technology investment across Africa as a source of leverage in such incidents. Among the planned participants for RightsCon was Lingua Sinica project coordinator Dalia Parete, who was due to speak on global PRC media engagements and interference.
