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Tag: China politics

Xi Jinping: A Year in the Headlines

Last year, an apparent drop in the frequency of appearances by President Xi Jinping in the state media — alongside cancelled participation in international gatherings such as the BRICS summit — invited speculation that China’s strongman was losing his grip on power. Closely observing the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper, we argued last July that these shifts were overstated. It was just too early to tell.

The headline results for 2025 are now in. So what observations can we now make about the standing of China’s top leader?

Before we jump into the analysis, it’s important to note again for those less familiar with CCP-run media that the People’s Daily is a constrained and consensus-based Party flagship paper with a high level of consistency in terms of pages and text density over its history — with highly formalized and repetitive language (more on that below). This is a key reason why the paper, a political signalling platform rather than a space for news or discussion, lends itself to frequency analysis.

The Center Holds

First off, we saw no change in the decisiveness of Xi-centric discourse, nor did we see any rising challenges from other members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) — an important indicator of shifts at the top. In the full year 2025, Xi Jinping appeared in close to 600 headlines in the People’s Daily, more than three times the number of headlines logged by China’s premier, Li Qiang (李强), the country’s second ranking party official.

At no point during the past year did this performance gap narrow in the flagship paper. Xi’s lead remained commanding, as it has done throughout his tenure. As readers can see from the graph below, the performance of all PSC members remained steady in 2025, with moderate declines for both Li Qiang and Zhao Leji (as well as Li Xi) against 2024 levels.

You may notice that above we referred to Xi-centric discourse rather than Xi-centric “coverage.” This is an important distinction, and critical to understanding how CCP media operate within China’s political and media systems. The articles in the People’s Daily do not just “cover” events on the political calendar in the same way that media elsewhere in the world do.

While coverage in a Western newspaper of a political leader’s attendance of a major diplomatic summit would warrant perhaps one report around key issues and points of relevance — with perhaps separate op-eds that reflect independent viewpoints — in China’s system of power signalling it results in a separate article for each diplomatic exchange that resulted. Consequently, a front page during a busy period for Chinese diplomacy can sometimes feel like a Xi Jinping identity parade.

During a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in August last year, the People’s Daily ran a front-page article for each head of state with whom Xi met.

Why is this ridiculousness necessary?

The Politics of Repetition

In the political system operated by the CCP, repetition is a crucial form of signaling and demonstrating power. This is an absolutely essential part of the People’s Daily’s role. Repetition is a basic way to instill the “main line” (主线) and ensure that the CCP media, as “mouthpieces” (喉舌) of the Party, are the “weathervanes” (风向标) pointing the political direction. This is why six handshakes at a single diplomatic summit become six distinct reports on the paper’s front page.

Understanding the political role of repetition also helps us contextualize another important observation from our 2025 numbers — the fact that headline mentions of Xi Jinping, while decisively in the lead, are also notably down.

When we look at headline appearances for members of the PSC (above), as well as front-page image counts (below), we can see that Xi had seen a notable decrease in appearances on both counts.

What does this mean?

In our analysis back in July last year, we noted that headline counts and images closely follow calendar events, and that over time the total counts can balance out. In other words, Xi’s counts may seem down in July, but then surge in August or October with a busy calendar or a concerted campaign of messaging around events such as Party plenums. Now, with all the data for 2025 accounted for, we can see that this downward trend was no error.

Headline mentions of Xi Jinping, while decisively in the lead, are also notably down.

It is true that Xi made fewer headline appearances this past year in the People’s Daily than in the two years previous. How dramatic was the shift? Xi’s appearances saw an overall drop of 21 percent in 2025. It was a similar story in image counts, where there was a 19 percent drop from the preceding two years. That is not negligible. And yet, as we said at the outset, name checks in front-page headlines for other PSC members remained uniform across all of these years — and far below the soaring heights enjoyed by Xi.

Does this quantitative drop signal a power drain?

While there is always room for error in the perilous business of CCP gazing, the broader context of People’s Daily signaling cautions against over-interpreting this decrease in frequency. First of all, we see continued wall-to-wall “coverage” — again, this is repetition and signalling — of Xi in People’s Daily, combined with a lack of any real challenger. This indicates that he is decisively in control of the narrative, and certainly that he remains the “core” (核心).

Secondly, there are other ways, beyond imperiled leadership, to understand these numbers. One possibility is a general drop in the number of global trips Xi made in 2025. As reporters and analysts have noted, Xi has delegated appearances at major international summits to his premier, Li Qiang. Skipping some of these summits naturally lessened Xi’s 2025 tally — which is to say that it lessened instances not just of “coverage,” but of repetition.

For those tempted to read too much into those absences, it’s important to note that Li’s attendance of these summits in particular did not drive a corresponding increase in article and image numbers for the premier. This is not because those events were not covered, but because they were not repeated like incessant drum beats to promote the leadership core.

The repetition that to most of us appears senseless, and even ridiculous, is a privilege enjoyed only by the man at the apex.

As we enter 2026 and Xi Jinping edges another year closer to the next Party Congress (2027), China’s repetition complex is something to carefully observe. Will the downward trend in his numbers continue? Only time will tell if there is real strength in Xi’s numbers.

Iron Rule

Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu (李家超) sent a letter to all civil servants on October 28 urging them to vote in the December 7 Legislative Council election, calling it “a concrete way to demonstrate their oath to uphold the Basic Law.” The pro-government Ta Kung Pao (大公報), controlled by the Liaison Office, responded with an editorial stating civil servant votes should be “iron votes” (鐵票) — unwavering support for the new electoral system. The case illustrated how civil servants face mounting pressure, including in state-backed media, to demonstrate political loyalty through voting.

The 2025 Hong Kong Legislative Council election will be held on December 7. IMAGE: InMediaHK.

Spare Words Win Wars

On many or even most days, the front page of the People’s Liberation Army Daily (解放軍報), the flagship newspaper of China’s top military leadership body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), is a mirror of the Party’s People’s Daily. But on Monday this week one of the most prominent pieces was an oddly unique report about — would you believe it? — how “proper writing wins battles.”

No, this was not an argument about information warfare (which the PLA pursues actively), and certainly not about how the pen is mightier than the sword. This was a message from the PLA leadership about the need to cut down on bureaucratic jargon, lest it have real consequences on the battlefield. What we can glean from this cautionary article is that official verbosity — a byproduct of China’s highly politicized military and leadership apparatus — is a genuine concern within the upper ranks.

The commentary promotes improved “writing styles and speaking styles” (文风话风) within the military, and argues that clear, concise communication directly impacts military effectiveness. To support its case, the piece claims that Communist military orders during the Civil War were terse compared to verbose Nationalist communications. While noting the problem as a general concern, the piece praises certain PLA units for adopting “concise, practical and new” (短实新) directives, with one unit limiting command documents to a single page and cutting message processing time by 50 percent. These examples demonstrate, the piece argues, that “proper writing and speaking styles can win battles” (好的文风好话风能够打胜仗).

The piece traces a direct lineage from Mao Zedong’s 1942 “Oppose Party Formalism” (反对党八股) speech in Yan’an — which attacked bureaucratic jargon using folksy language — to Xi Jinping’s 2012 “Eight-Point Regulation” (八项规定) that sought to curb official rhetoric. But this may be a losing battle. After all, specialized political jargon, which gives rise to verbosity and ritualistic repetition, is hardwired into the system.

“The style of our writing is the style of our troops; the efficiency of our language is the efficiency of our combat. The battlefield has no room for niceties and nonsense — a few wasted words, a single wasted minute, could mean more bloodshed and sacrifice.”

Is Xi’s Grip Holding?

Speculation about Xi Jinping’s waning influence intensified late last month following news of his planned absence from this week’s BRICS summit in Rio, on top of reports suggesting his presence in China’s state-run media has declined. Willy Wo-Lap Lam at the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief noted that “citations of Xi’s name have become thinner and thinner in authoritative official media,” raising questions about potential leadership changes as China approaches its next Party congress.

However, our analysis of front-page headlines in the Party’s official People’s Daily challenges this narrative. Comparing the second quarters of 2024 and 2025, we found that Xi appeared in headlines 177 times versus 157 times respectively — a modest decline likely explained by incomplete June 2025 data. More significantly, Premier Li Qiang, Xi’s closest competitor, showed virtually no change with 45 appearances in 2024 and 43 in 2025.

While these headline counts cannot capture insider dynamics or leadership effectiveness, they hardly suggest a power shift in the Party’s most important publication. Xi’s dominance in China’s authoritative media remains intact — contradicting speculation about his declining grip on power. The data suggests China’s most powerful leader in generations continues to command overwhelming media attention. Read more on this at the China Media Project website.