Entity Type: PRC Party-State Agency

The State Council Information Office (SCIO) is the external nameplate of the Central Propaganda Department (中共中央宣傳部) of the Chinese Communist Party. Established in January 1991, SCIO was created to improve China’s international image following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Until 2014, SCIO operated under the arrangement known as “one institution with two names” (一個機構兩塊牌子) alongside the Office of External Propaganda (OEP). In May 2014, the OEP was formally absorbed into the Central Propaganda Department, transforming SCIO into an external nameplate. SCIO’s functions include holding press conferences on major national policies, providing media materials to introduce China internationally, assisting foreign journalists covering China, and encouraging Chinese media to report on international news. While SCIO’s official description claims it “promotes communication, understanding and trust between China and countries across the world,” scholars describe it as the “public face” of China’s “foreign propaganda work.”

The Cyberspace Administration of China, established in May 2011 as the State Internet Information Office, functions as China’s powerful internet regulator and censor. Now serving as the executive arm of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (chaired by Xi Jinping), the CAC implements far-reaching censorship, regulates internet content, and oversees data security policies. Led by Zhuang Rongwen (庄榮文), who concurrently serves as a deputy head of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department (officially translated as “Publicity Department”), the agency exercises extensive powers through the 2016 Cybersecurity Law and 2021 Data Security Law. The CAC’s activities include censoring “rumors,” controlling cross-border data transfers, requiring pre-review of online comments, ensuring AI systems uphold Communist Party ideology, and maintaining majority ownership in the China Internet Investment Fund (中國互聯網投資基金), which holds stakes in major tech companies like ByteDance and Weibo through “golden shares.”

The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is a professional research institute established in 1956 and directly administered by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Originally founded as the Institute of International Relations of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, it was renamed the Institute of International Relations in 1958 and assumed its current name in December 1986. In 1998, the China Center for International Studies was incorporated into CIIS. The institute focuses on global politics and economics research to facilitate central government decision-making. CIIS comprises eight departments covering regional studies and strategic analysis, with four affiliate bodies. In July 2020, CIIS opened the Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Foreign Affairs. In 2020, CIIS was designated as one of China’s 29 “national high-level think tanks.” The organization employs approximately 200 researchers and staff, typically led by former Chinese ambassadors.

The All-China Journalists Association was established on November 8, 1937, originally as the Chinese Young Journalists Association (中國青年記者協會), founded by wartime reporter Fan Changjiang (范長江) in Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Operating as “a national people’s organization of the Chinese press under the leadership of the Communist Party of China,” the organization claims to represent over one million journalism professionals through 217 member organizations. The ACJA serves primarily to implement party media policies rather than protecting press freedom, with its constitution explicitly stating it “serves as a bridge between the Party, the Chinese government and the press.” The organization plays a central role in China’s media diplomacy through initiatives like the Belt and Road News Network, launched in 2017 to cultivate relationships with journalists from Global South countries, with the ACJA working closely with the CCP’s United Front Work Department to manage outreach to international journalists. While presenting itself as a professional association that “safeguards the legitimate rights and interests of journalists,” independent analysis notes that the ACJA’s primary function remains ensuring media compliance with party directives through mechanisms including mandatory training in “Marxist View of Journalism” rather than defending journalistic independence.

Established in 2024 as an international outreach arm of Jiangmen’s United Front system, the Jiangmen Overseas Chinese Media Center operates under the direct control of the Jiangmen Returned Overseas Chinese Federation (江门市归国华侨联合会). The center is chaired by Yang Xuedong (杨学东), who simultaneously serves as a vice chairman of the Federation. Its primary mission involves cultivating relationships with overseas Chinese-language media to disseminate “Jiangmen stories” internationally. As of 2023, the center claimed partnerships with over 100 overseas Chinese media outlets across 57 countries. It regularly reports to the Federation’s Party Committee Secretary and holds quarterly work meetings where Federation officials provide directives and guidance for its international propaganda efforts.

Established in 1955, according to the federation‘s official website, the Jiangmen Returned Overseas Chinese Federation functions as a mass organization founded and led by the Chinese Communist Party to serve as a bridge between the Party-state and overseas Chinese communities. Operating under the direct leadership of the Jiangmen Municipal Party Committee, but linked to the national United Front Work Department system, the Federation claims to employ 12 staff members across three departments and oversees eight affiliated organizations, including the Jiangmen Overseas Chinese Media Center (江門市僑媒中心). Following the principle of “working domestically while influencing internationally,” the Federation implements overseas United Front work through cultural exchanges, business promotion, and media outreach. According to its website, it has established 986 overseas Chinese organizations citywide, with 437 Party-led overseas Chinese work stations. The Federation actively collaborates with the United Front Work Department to implement the “Overseas Chinese Affairs Strong City” initiative while maintaining relationships with 74 overseas Chinese media outlets across 30 countries.

Established in 2014 by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the China-Africa Press Center (CAPC) functions as a key component of Beijing’s media diplomacy in Africa. The center invites selected African journalists for 10-month stays in China, combining academic study at prestigious institutions with guided reporting tours of Chinese cities, factories, and government events. While officially described as helping African media “accurately report on China,” the program strategically shapes perceptions by exposing journalists to carefully curated positive aspects of Chinese development. Nigerian journalist Solomon Elusoji, who participated in 2018, noted his initial skepticism transformed after seeing China’s infrastructure, though he maintained that African countries must “make full use” of China-Africa relations. The program shows Beijing’s systematic approach to cultivating favorable media coverage in African countries through direct engagement with journalists.