Tag: Africa

We Thought We Were Going to Learn About Journalism

Written by Dalia Parete on June 2, 2026. Posted in Interviews.

For decades since Xinhua opened its first African bureau in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1950, China’s state news agency maintained a modest presence on the continent, part of the PRC’s broader international newswire infrastructure. But over the past two decades — and especially since the launch of Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 — Beijing’s footprint in the African media space has expanded into something of a different order altogether. Xinhua now operates 37 bureaus across the continent, dwarfing any other news agency, African or foreign. Chinese digital television giant StarTimes has become the second-largest pay-TV operator in Africa. As Western news organizations have lost staff correspondents across Africa, China has moved to fill the media gap — not only through its own outlets and ventures, but through a sophisticated web of partnerships with local media and governments, and training programs for journalists.

Yet for all the outside analysis, one perspective has been consistently missing from this debate: that of African journalists themselves. How do the reporters at the center of this story actually experience China’s media push? And what do they make of it?

This is exactly what Emeka Umejei, a Nigerian-born media scholar who spent over a decade as a journalist himself, set out to understand. In his new book, China in African Media: Between Influence Operations and Decolonization, published by Bloomsbury, he draws on interviews with journalists across 14 African countries to offer what has been lacking: an account of China’s media strategy told from the journalist’s point of view.

Dalia Parete: You’ve just published China in African Media: Between Influence Operations and Decolonization.What drew you to this topic, and why did you feel this book needed to be written now?

Emeka Umejei: If you are from Africa or from the Global South, you would have noticed that anything people from the Global North do with African countries is framed as a continuation of colonial ideology. The PRC has been smart. They know that. So they say: Our engagement in Africa is win-win. We were also colonized. So every one of our engagements is part of decolonization. They play on that delicate balance to win many battles in Africa.

At the Third Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee in July 2024, the CCP proposed to establish a more effective international communication system. And when they say that, the PRC is talking about decolonization. Then, in September 2025, the Xinhua Institute published a policy paper titled Colonization of the Mind: The Means, Roots and Global Policies of US Cognitive Warfare. So what the PRC is trying to say is that the US system is colonial, but its own system is decolonial — fed from the ground by what local people want, not imposed.

So I decided to investigate the PRC’s multimodal engagements in African media, whether it advances decolonization or Chinese propaganda. Does it actually advance decolonization in African journalism, or Chinese propaganda in African media? The answer is obviously no. China is not doing anything different from the US or the UK.

The problem is that African political actors have yet to realize this. And if China gains the kind of hegemony in Africa that the US had, it’s going to be much, much worse. Nobody is thinking about the next twenty, thirty or fifty years. When China achieves that level of hegemony economically, in the media, in every part of the African continent — how will that affect democracy in Africa? Nobody is talking about this. These are the critical issues nobody is paying attention to. That’s what motivated my research.

DP: For those not familiar with the topic, can you give us a brief overview of how Chinese media have expanded across Africa over the past decade or so, and what types of engagements between Chinese media and their African counterparts can be seen across the continent? I’m guessing there are a lot of regional differences.

Umejei: Over time, while Western media organizations were pulling out of Africa, Chinese media organizations such as Xinhua, China Daily, CGTN Africa and the People’s Daily have expanded in Africa.

There are several engagements between Chinese and African media. I can list them for you. You have the China-Africa media exchanges for African journalists. You have media partnership and content-sharing agreements. You have African media having membership in the Belt and Road News Network (一带一路新闻合作联盟), a Beijing-headquartered media alliance chaired by the People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s official newspaper. And you have what they call opinion writers in Africa, where African journalists, scholars and columnists publish op-eds in mainstream African newspapers, with the aim of spreading Chinese narratives on specific topics. There’s also the digital space — a digital satellite television service was launched across Africa [with China’s involvement].

In terms of approach, they basically have the same objective. There could be regional differences, but the goals and objectives are actually the same. It’s all about, so to speak, influence operations. The recruitment process is very, very different across the regions. The way they recruit journalists to attend media exchanges in Nigeria differs from the way they recruit in Sierra Leone or Egypt. These are different methods of recruitment. But in terms of the objective, which is to influence, it’s the same.

DP: Your book argues that the PRC’s most effective work in African media is done through partnerships with local outlets. How did that strategy come about, and why is it effective?

Umejei: I think what happened was that the Party realized that there’s no trust for Chinese media in Africa. People are just skeptical of Chinese media organizations, saying: Okay, if the Chinese media organizations cannot critically engage with the political leaders in China, how do we trust them to engage critically with us in Africa? So, having realized that, they said: Okay, the best thing we should do is to have a partnership. So instead of just coming to Africa to engage directly, they now have engagement with local media.

There are these media exchanges where they take journalists to China; those journalists come back to Africa and become advocates for the PRC in newsrooms across Africa. Then you have the media partnership and content-sharing agreements, which let them disseminate their own messaging through content they share with African media organizations without it being censored. Most of this content is free of charge. It is not paid for. You also have the Belt and Road News Network, which incorporates African media organizations and journalists, and the Belt and Road Journalist Network, a network comprising African journalists.

In the long run, it gives them a multifaceted influence across African media and Africa generally. Because you have the Chinese media, which is not doing well in Africa even though it’s there, but these other engagements are more profound than Chinese media operations. That’s the essence.

DP: The title of your book frames a tension between “influence operations” and “decolonization.” Many African journalists and scholars argue that Western media have imposed their own editorial values and agendas. Does China’s media expansion genuinely offer an alternative to that dominance, or are African journalists simply being asked to swap one outside power for another?

Umejei: If you ask me, I would say that Chinese media engagement in Africa does not offer an alternative to the West. I’ll give an example. When I was doing fieldwork for my PhD in Kenya, I spoke to [African] journalists who were working for CGTN, Xinhua andChina Daily. They will tell you that it’s the same thing. The Chinese media cover Africa the same way that the West covers Africa, except when Chinese economic and political interests are involved. For instance, if it involves Chinese economic and political interests, they’re going to be very, very positive about it. But if it has nothing to do with China and no Chinese company is involved, they’ll just report it the way the Western media will.

People want to learn, but it just isn’t there, because the real purpose of the training isn’t journalistic. It’s an influence operation.

So they’re not offering any alternative. It’s just that they want to make African journalists think: Oh, the West impose their own agenda. So this is the truth of the matter. It’s not as if [China] offers any genuine alternative. Africans generally are not switching sides. Instead, they will have to contend with both sides. It will be a coexistence. So you have both Chinese ideology and Western ideology coexisting in Africa.

“Emphasizing positive news” has been a guiding principle of China’s Central Propaganda Department (中宣部) since at least 1984. At a February 1995 conference of editors in chief of provincial-level newspapers, propaganda minister Ding Guangen said: “By supporting unity and stability, emphasizing positive news and speaking with one voice, we have achieved success in setting examples, leading and encouraging [the people] (People’s Daily, February 27, 1995). Ji Bingxuan, a deputy propaganda minister, said: “The relationship between positive and negative news must be well-managed. We must always support the guiding principle, which is to encourage unity and stability by emphasizing positive news. This principle must be followed with news reports … China is so vast and diverse, its development so unequal.”

DP: China often presents itself as a partner of the Global South as a whole, but, as you said in your book, the Global South is not monolithic. Do you think China’s media strategy is actually adapting to different local contexts, or is it essentially a one-size-fits-all approach?

Umejei: What they have done, and they’ve done well, is the partnership. For instance, with their partnership in Zimbabwe, when you listen to this news, this CCP-sanctioned narrative, it comes from a Zimbabwean media organization. As a Zimbabwean, you are more likely to believe it. So you could say yes, it’s through local organizations, and that makes it easier for them, it makes it easier for the message to be sent.

Take Nigeria as an example: people do not read CGTN or China Daily. Instead, you are going to see national newspaper This Day and daily newspaper Daily Trust pushing Chinese narratives in their articles and the readers do not know it is coming from China. So it makes it very, very effective. The locals don’t see China. They don’t see the PRC. But they see this content being disseminated in local media. That’s the advantage.

Xi Jinping hosts African leaders ahead of the 2024 edition of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. SOURCE: Xinhua News Agency.

Chinese media engagement in Africa does not offer an alternative to the West.

DP: You were also talking about how journalists from different countries have a different view of China. You were saying, for example, that South African journalists might have a different understanding of China than Zambian journalists. So it also depends not only on China but also on the local context, I guess.

Umejei: Right. You see, where a country has an established democracy, that itself pushes back against the whole PRC propaganda effort. Take South Africa. The democracy there is established, and the media is solid. The South African media is different from the media in other parts of Africa. So it’s difficult to influence what happens there. You’d get serious pushback. Unlike in Nigeria, where even if you just give journalists some stipends, they’ll do your dirty work. But you won’t get that in South Africa, because if you try it, other media organizations will come after you, and you don’t want that. So those are some of the contextual realities that mediate the influence. It really only holds where you have a very, very dominant, established democracy like South Africa. Nowhere else in Africa. I’d say it’s only in South Africa you find that. Not Nigeria, not even Ghana.

DP: It’s always important to consider the agency of local journalists, and not assume they simply accept what China and other powers offer. Your research is based on interviews with journalists across 14 African countries. In their own words, how do African journalists describe the experience of Chinese training programs — from how they were selected to what they actually took away from it?

Umejei: I want you to understand something about Africa. I was a journalist for more than a decade. In Nigeria, there were times when I didn’t receive a salary for more than 15 months. So I wasn’t getting my monthly salary. Now, China comes to train you. You have the opportunity to go to China. They’ll pay for your ticket and everything. You come back and you’re able to save maybe two million or three million [in local currency]. With the money you save, you can build a house or buy a car. Everyone is happy. So journalists are happy that they can go to China. It’s mostly about the economic benefits. If I go there then I come back, I can build my house in the village. I can buy a new car, or I can repair my car. If I don’t go, how can I do that? So I should be grateful to them. That comes before anything.

That indebtedness is what the Chinese also play on. Most African journalists become indebted and advocates for the PRC. These are critical issues. Nobody is talking about the economic aspects of it. Because of the economic aspect, they don’t really bother about what happens, whether the training is good or bad. It doesn’t concern them. But among them, there are some people who say: Okay, even though we went there, when we were going, we thought we were going to learn about journalism. But we didn’t learn much about journalism. We went there, it was just hospitality.

DP: In the book, some journalists mentioned the training courses are mostly about how beautiful China is, but that the technical training falls flat, can you expand on that?

Umejei: Yes, there’s very little actual journalism in these programs. People want to learn, but it just isn’t there, because the real purpose of the training isn’t journalistic. It’s an influence operation. The aim is to have a positive outlook on China, so you’ll advance its interests in Africa. That’s the whole point of it. It’s not about you: you’re not part of the equation.

And that’s what makes it so hard for participants to grasp. It’s not about you. You go to China, come back, and you’ve learned nothing about journalism. You feel cheated. They hand you the equipment but never teach you how to use it, which is painful, because you could easily have learned it and put it to use back home. But that was never the purpose. The purpose was simply for you to get to know China, see what they’ve built, and go home and tell people about it. That’s all they want.

A group of African journalists visit Chongqing after the conclusion of the 2024 FOCAC Summit. SOURCE: CGTN.

Most African journalists become indebted and advocates for the PRC.

DP: You also document cases of self-censorship among African journalists who engage with Chinese media partnerships. How widespread is that and is it self-imposed, or are there more explicit pressures, like the role of local embassies?

Umejei: When journalists return from training in China, they’re added to a WhatsApp group. Most of the people who have gone for training in China are part of it, and the Chinese embassy uses that group to disseminate information and talking points.

If you’re in that group, it works like a leash. You won’t write anything negative about China, because you’re always thinking about the next training trip. They keep a pool of journalists. Once you’ve gone, someone else gets added to the pool and sent next. That rotation keeps everyone in line. You don’t want to write something critical and risk being excluded from the group, because exclusion means no more training opportunities and no more money from them. Nobody wants to end up in that bad group.

A few people do come back and say, “I don’t want to do this anymore.” But only a few.

DP: After all those conversations, is there one thing a journalist said to you that you feel really captures the essence of what is happening between China and African media today?

Umejei: One of them told me: We don’t feel our engagement, our training in China, is unethical. Why? Because our countries are also engaging with China. So why should we not engage with them? Why should we not go there for training? People are going there to borrow money, to collect money for infrastructure development. What is wrong if a journalist is going to get training there?

That kind of captures what it is. It means that Chinese engagement with African countries is indirectly influencing the media space too, because journalists are involved in that. The government is also playing with China. So why should you, as a journalist, not play with China? That’s what it is for me.

DP: Could you talk about responses that African countries and journalism communities should have? How can they maintain their independence in the face of outside media pressures?

Umejei: One of the things Africa should do first is that African political actors and policymakers should fund their own journalism. If you continue to wait for external actors to fund journalism training, this will continue. African governments decide to fund training opportunities for journalists themselves, and what we’re saying will continue, unfortunately. So there’s no better response than to say, “Okay, if we have the media, let’s look for a way to develop the journalists themselves.” If you get opportunities, even if it’s for two weeks, make it a mandatory professional training program for journalists, funded by the government, a government agency, or someone locally. It must not stand alone, not dependent on outsiders. Until that is done, we’re just joking, actually.

The way to maintain independence is sustainability — to be self-sustaining. It means you have to fund yourself. If you can’t fund yourself, if you can’t sustain yourself, you won’t be able to be independent, because you’ll be depending on people to sustain you. Once you depend on foreign organizations to sustain you, that’s a problem.

There is also a need to have an African-grown global media, which is not there. I don’t think there’s any global media from Africa. There’s no global media that tells the true African story on the global stage. There is none. That’s where the problem is. That’s actually the first problem. Because if there were an African-grown global media corporation that would tell the true African story on the global stage, it would be very, very difficult for other global media — from the West or from China or from wherever — to tell a different story of the African reality on the global stage.

Global Powers, African Stories

Written by Dalia Parete on January 15, 2025. Posted in Interviews. No Comments on Global Powers, African Stories

The African media landscape has become a contested space where global powers vie for influence and narrative control. While Western media have historically dominated, Chinese and Russian outlets are gaining ground, using their own distinct approaches to shape public opinion. Amid this competition, local media and audiences are also asserting their agency, pursuing their personal interests and presenting worldviews that have been uniquely shaped by the region’s past.

We spoke with Dani Madrid Morales, a media scholar at the University of Sheffield, about how China and Russia have been navigating the African media landscape — where their approaches converge, and where they sharply diverge. Our conversation covered how historical anti-colonial sentiments continue to shape the reception of foreign media, and how African journalists and audiences engage with these competing global narratives.

Dalia Parete: How do China and Russia make use of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments in Africa to push their narratives?

Dani Madrid Morales: We were interested in how people talk about Chinese and Russian disinformation in Africa and how much focus there is on whether their stories are spreading and how effective they are. Everyone talks a lot about how compelling their narratives are — like blaming NATO for the war in Ukraine and saying it’s not Russia’s fault — but we wanted to dig into why some African countries don’t buy into that. The key thing we found is the prevalence of anti-US sentiment, which has deep roots in the Soviet Union and China pushing anti-colonial ideas in the 60s and 70s.

Back then, China was seen as a victim of colonialism, so that message resonated. Now, China is sometimes accused of being the colonizer itself in Africa, but the reality is a lot of African countries still feel exploited by the West. China and Russia know how to use that. Like when George Floyd was killed, and all the racial tension kicked off in the US, China jumped on that, using it to describe America as a racist country. And while it’s not all false, it has some truth. So, the thing is, China’s not doing straight-up disinformation in Africa — they just pick and choose facts and frame them in ways that connect with people’s lived experiences, which makes it hard just to call it all lies.

China’s not doing straight-up disinformation in Africa — they just pick and choose facts and frame them in ways that connect with people’s lived experiences.

DP: How else do China and Russia’s approaches differ in Africa?

DMM: China and Russia use very different methods in Africa. Russia tends to use more aggressive, hostile tactics, like fabricating attacks or spreading false accusations, especially in places like the Sahel region covering Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. They treat information like a weapon in a war, similar to how the US or France have used these tools in the region.

China doesn’t typically go that route. It has a softer approach. While it does spread misinformation on issues like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, it is more about protecting its interests and image globally, not specifically in Africa. China does not only directly accuse the West of wrongdoing but also highlights the differences between itself and Western countries — for example, how China isn’t a colonial power. It frames things like low-interest loans and medical aid as positive. Still, it often hides the negative side, like how Chinese companies exploit Africa’s mining sector with poor conditions for workers.

While Russia is more about information warfare, China is about shaping its image through PR. Both countries use these tactics based on their different goals. China’s approach shifts if it feels threatened, like during the COVID pandemic, when it adopted more aggressive tactics to defend its image.

DP: What have African residents themselves been doing to counter these efforts?

DMM: Some people in Africa, like journalists or influencers, get exposed to China and end up repeating China’s narratives. For example, a journalist from Ghana might go to China, spend some time there, and then return to Ghana, appearing on Chinese media like CGTN or Xinhua, repeating what China wants them to say. Some genuinely believe in China’s progress, such as the claim that China has lifted 100 million people out of poverty.

However, the average African person might not care much about Xinjiang or Tibet. What they do care more about is anything that paints the West negatively, which is a strong sentiment across the continent. So, they’re more likely to engage when they hear Chinese or Russian narratives criticizing the West.

DP: Based on your findings, to what extent do citizens actively engage with or resist these narratives, and what factors influence their responses?

DMM: There are people like the Swiss-Cameroonian Nathalie Yamb who spread Russian narratives, but not many influencers push Chinese narratives. However, some political groups in Africa, especially those on the extreme left, are using these anti-US and anti-colonial ideas alongside Chinese and Russian examples.

CGTN plays at a Kenya Broadcasting Corporation control room in Nairobi. Photo: Dani Madrid Morales.

Most Africans aren’t concerned with issues like Xinjiang but care about the more significant global power struggle. They might have sided with the US in the past, but now they’re more ambivalent. That’s where China has succeeded — it’s created space for people to feel neutral or even lean toward China rather than the West. It’s not that they’re super pro-China but they’re not anti-China either.

That’s where China has succeeded — it’s created space for people to feel neutral.

DP: How do local media outlets fit into this strategy?

DMM: Some African media outlets help spread messages from China in various ways. One significant method is through Chinese diplomats publishing opinion pieces in local media. These pieces are often presented as equally valid as other voices, giving them a platform to influence public opinion. For example, after an editor in Burundi visited China, his newspaper became almost entirely pro-China. When the Chinese foreign minister visited, the paper ran several editorials praising China. The content in these pieces often blurs the line between fact and propaganda—it’s more opinion than hard news. China is very strategic about this and even tracks how successful these efforts are, measuring how many opinion pieces written by ambassadors are published in foreign media.

DP: How do China and Russia distribute their content through African media, and why do local outlets participate in these arrangements?

DMM: Another method is content-sharing agreements, where China and Russia provide media outlets with free content. Chinese news agency Xinhua and Russian outlets like Ruptly supply articles and video content, which local media may republish. Often, the source isn’t disclosed, making the content appear as though the local outlet created it. This practice is referred to as “information laundering.” For example, in South Africa, the African News Agency (ANA), which has close ties with China, often distributes Xinhua’s content as if it were its own.

The *China Daily* offered for free at an airport in South Africa. Photo: Dani Madrid Morales.

As for why local media outlets do this, the motivation isn’t always clear-cut. Many editors don’t have a specific agenda and simply publish content as part of their regular duties, treating foreign content, whether from Xinhua or Agence France Presse, like any other. In some cases, though, like with Independent Media in South Africa, there is a clear financial or political interest in promoting China’s viewpoint. The owner of that media group has close connections with China’s Communist Party and supports China’s global initiatives. Generally, while European people might be more skeptical of content from outlets like Xinhua, many people in other parts of the world don’t see it that way. To them, content from Xinhua is just another news source, just as trustworthy as anything from outlets like the BBC.

To them, content from Xinhua is just another news source, just as trustworthy as anything from outlets like the BBC.

DP: What informs African journalists’ views on foreign media and foreign influence?

DMM: How journalists in Africa view media from different countries, especially China, Russia, and the West, differs significantly from the mindset many of us might have in places like Europe or the U.S.

For example, when I worked at Spain’s national broadcaster covering international news, my colleagues and I would always see the BBC’s reports as trustworthy — though we’d still stay skeptical, like any other journalists — and see Russia’s or China’s CGTN’s news through a very suspicious lens. We were trained to believe that the BBC was pretty independent, while anything from authoritarian regimes like Russia or China was viewed with serious doubt. But when I’ve been in African newsrooms, I’ve noticed that many journalists don’t share that same mindset. To some, the BBC also has an agenda, and they don’t automatically trust it just because it’s from the West. The BBC might align with some of their values, but they’re not blindly following it like we might.

I remember interviewing journalists in Lesotho, a small country in Southern Africa, and I asked them about these concerns with Chinese media. One journalist stopped me mid-interview and asked, “Why are you questioning me about China and not CNN or BBC? Why do you assume that Chinese media is bad?” That threw me off because, from my perspective as someone who cares deeply about media freedom, I could never see China as a good partner for journalists. But to him, it wasn’t about that — his issue was that I was treating China differently from Western media outlets. I think this comes back to a deeper historical context of anti-colonial feelings.

“Why are you questioning me about China and not CNN or BBC? Why do you assume that Chinese media is bad?”Question from a journalist in Lesotho

DP: Do they see Western media organizations like the BBC as more or less reliable than Chinese or Russian state media?

DMM: The BBC has a different legacy for older African journalists — especially those who lived through colonial rule. They remember it as a tool of British colonialism, even though the UK and its foreign policy have changed. In their view, whether it’s China, Russia, or the UK, all these foreign powers come into their countries with their interests. And none of them are genuinely looking out for the local people. So, for many African journalists, it’s not about trusting or distrusting one foreign power more than the other. They tend to be equally cautious of all foreign media, viewing them through a lens shaped by their history with colonialism.

While journalists who studied in the West might still give more respect to French or British media, that’s not the case across the continent. The general sentiment is much more skeptical of foreign press, even if they treat Western media like the BBC differently from Chinese or Russian outlets. And that’s where the real difference lies. Western journalists might see China or Russia as dictatorships that control information, which requires caution when handling their news. However, for many African journalists, that same level of skepticism should also be applied to French or British outlets, given that they, too, have agendas.

DP: How has China become involved in Africa’s media landscape?

DMM: China has been in Africa’s media game since the late 1950s when Radio Peking [now China Radio International] began broadcasts in Arabic for North African countries and Xinhua set up a bureau in Cairo. Despite going through tough times like the Cultural Revolution in the 70s and 80s, China never left the African media space. In the late 90s and early 2000s, China began a push to change how it was seen globally. They used Africa as a testing ground, and by 2004 China had opened a local radio station in Nairobi — the first time they broadcasted locally via FM radio instead of long-wave.

DP: How has their presence changed since then?

DM: The digital era brought a complete transformation in China’s strategy. They established CGTN’s office in Nairobi, produced documentaries showcasing China’s positive impact on Africa, and highlighted significant projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. They were smart about hiring local journalists and investing substantial resources to strengthen their digital presence.

By the 2010s, China shifted its approach. This led to more strategic moves: embedding content in local African media, forming partnerships with media outlets, and having Chinese diplomats take a more active role in public discourse. The real turning point was 2018-19 when their approach became more assertive. Instead of promoting China’s achievements, they actively challenged Western narratives, especially around issues like Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Covid-19.

DP: What are some trends in China’s messaging that you’re now noticing?

DMM: In recent years, CGTN Africa has focused heavily on Africa, producing two hours of news daily. But there’s been a noticeable shift. While CGTN used to be somewhat more neutral and pragmatic in the early days, there’s now much more ideological content, especially around Xi Jinping and China’s global influence. They cover the US much more, but it’s usually pretty negative — highlighting flaws in American democracy and social issues. It’s not all global politics, though — CGTN Africa mostly sticks to regional matters, like the Sahel region or events in places like Niger and Mali.

China takes a unique approach to covering Africa: it almost always sides with the ruling party.

However, China takes a unique approach to covering Africa: it almost always sides with the ruling party. For example, when elections took place in Mozambique, China’s media congratulated the incumbent before the results were announced. There’s relatively little focus on opposition parties. And just like with other Chinese media, if the government wants a specific topic covered, it will push it.

KBC rebroadcasts CGTN’s Africa Live news bulletin. Photo: Dani Madrid Morales.

DP: Can you assess the impact of Chinese media in Africa?

DMM: The impact of China’s media on Africa is complicated. In most African countries, China isn’t a topic in the daily press. It only becomes a focus when a significant event, like a controversy or a state visit. Before Covid-19, Chinese media barely had any presence in local news. After the pandemic hit, coverage exploded, but China’s day-to-day media impact is still minimal. People’s opinions on China tend to come from their personal interactions with Chinese workers or products — not from the media.

For example, during a trip to Kenya, I visited rural areas and asked locals about their views on China. The people had positive views, but it wasn’t because they were watching CGTN or Chinese films but primarily because of their experiences with Chinese workers building infrastructure or running small businesses. It’s the same with Chinese products — people recognize they are often low quality, influencing their opinion of China.

Also, the media landscape makes a difference. There are no permanent African correspondents in China. So, most news comes from agencies like Xinhua or Reuters, not local reporters. This lack of local coverage means China isn’t a daily topic in the news. You might hear about the US or Europe, but China rarely makes the front page unless there’s something big going on.

DP: What about the impact of social media?

DMM: Social media does have an impact, but it’s mostly just for a small group of people — like young, urban folks who are somewhat educated. In places like South Sudan, only 10 percent of the population is online, so social media isn’t significant for most people. But it’s a different story in countries like Ghana or Kenya, where more people have smartphones. Social media, especially TikTok and YouTube, is more important for the younger crowd.

It’s hard to say how much social media directly changes people’s opinions. The big difference is that online spaces have more room for debate and controversy than traditional media, which tends to be controlled by those in power. Like, remember when Chinese businesspeople were accused of mistreating Zimbabweans? That went viral on social media, which wouldn’t have made the news otherwise. China’s getting better at handling these situations, though.

But, honestly, there’s not a massive wave of anti-China sentiment in Africa. Sure, there are small pockets, but it’s pretty marginal. People aren’t talking about China in politics or elections. It just doesn’t come up much. Even if there’s some criticism online, it’s not a big deal. Most of the time, China’s pretty popular.

China is also good at subtly influencing things. CGTN, for example, will back up the government more than the opposition, but it’s not like they’re openly pressuring the media to shut down critical stories. It’s not like in Europe, where Chinese diplomats will put pressure on journalists to kill damaging stories. China’s influence in Africa is much more low-key, and public opinion stays positive.