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Tag: Chinese state media

Telling China’s Story, One Bottle at a Time

Meeting in Beijing last week, China’s annual political gathering, the “Two Sessions,” introduced plans for the country’s economy and society over the coming year. Technologies like AI were a clear focus in the premier’s government work report. But not all of the gadgets taking center stage in media coverage were so high-tech. Enter the vintage hot water bottle.

On March 12, as the annual plenary meetings of the country’s top legislative and advisory bodies concluded, the Ningbo Daily published a story in which reporter Cheng Liangtian (成良田) described becoming curious about the apparently long-used hot water bottles passed out at the conference. A staff member explained, according to the report, that the National People’s Congress “has always emphasized thriftiness.” The reporter then discovered that the model, now discontinued, had been manufactured three decades ago. 

Cheng concluded by drawing a not-so-journalistic link between the humble vessel and the mystique of Chinese Communist Party power: “Through an old hot water bottle, one glimpses the spirit of diligence and frugality that defines a great party,” he wrote. 

What can explain such a strange fuss over water bottles? And why is the Ningbo Daily reporter getting so warmed up about this oddball topic?

With this month’s political meetings touching on issues with the potential to unsettle — unemployment, sluggish consumer spending, a flagging economy — focusing on the minutiae of thrifty housekeeping can serve as an effective distraction. Or so the authorities hope. China’s economic outlook is far from optimistic. The GDP growth target set at this year’s Two Sessions was 4.5 to 5 percent — the lowest in 35 years. And as early as January, Cai Qi (蔡奇), one of the country’s top leaders, instructed propaganda officials to “place economic publicity in a position of importance” and tighten “guidance over public sentiment.”

Small diversions have long served larger propaganda goals in China. In his 2018 book China’s Digital Nationalism, Florian Schneider, a professor at Leiden University who studies political communication in the PRC, describes how the authorities treat China’s media networks as an “info-web” — using their central position within it to inject officially approved “symbols and statements into discourses about the nation, its leaders, and their sovereignty.” Journalists for state media in China learn too that one of their most critical roles is to help create this symbolic world, at the expense of reporting facts. In this system of meaning creation, the battered hot water bottle can be a perfectly serviceable tool.

Hot water bottles at the NPC are a minor but telling case in point, one of many such non-news diversions communicated during the course of the meetings — including the ubiquitous AI robot, a symbol of the country’s tech dominance and ambition. The props invite the public to celebrate frugality as an imagined virtue of the CCP leadership, while turning their gaze away from real social and economic challenges.

The story quickly went viral. The hashtag “The Great Hall of the People’s Hot Water Bottle Has Been Used for 30 Years” (#人民大会堂的热水瓶用了30年#) trended on Weibo, where it was picked up and amplified by state and commercial media outlets.

Even the manufacturer — a company in Jiaxing, Zhejiang province — weighed in, telling reporters that it had been sending staff to the Great Hall every year for 16 years to carry out maintenance, and that “no matter how material life changes, frugality is always the foundation.” 

Not all readers, however, were warmed by the nostalgic glow of the water bottle story. On Weibo, alongside supportive comments, some users pointed out the irony that keeping the old bottles going had likely cost more than simply replacing them. Another declared that “the most hilarious and farcical video of the year has arrived.”

On Reddit, where Chinese-language communities often include diaspora users and those accessing the platform via VPN, the verdict was blunter still: “What is the government doing with this kind of stunt other than performing and spreading a sense of panic? They keep telling residents to spend more, while the government itself puts on this pointless show.”

As inconsequential as the news story was, it did not go unexamined. Wuyue Sanren (五岳散人), a former Chinese media insider turned independent commentator now based in Kyoto, took to his YouTube channel to raise questions about several of the story’s key claims. Drawing on his experience working within China’s state media system, he noted that bottles and other such objects — far from being frugally preserved — are routinely cycled out of use every three-four years as necessary. He also questioned why the timeline in subsequent reports had quietly shifted from “30 years” to “16 years” of use. One likely reason, he said, was that the media indeed calculated, as social media users had snidely remarked, that ongoing maintenance costs would have exceeded simple replacement costs, undermining the core narrative of frugality. 

A Xinhua News Agency report on robots, this one speaking to the elderly in Shenzhen, is one of hundreds in state media during the “Two Meetings.” 

So why keep them? Wuyue Sanren set aside the rational explanations — frugality, tradition, and so on — and pointed to something else more basic: superstition. For all the Party’s public denunciations of superstitious thinking, he said, a quiet fear in the leadership runs just beneath the surface. Changing out objects associated with political continuity, even worn-out hot water bottles in a ceremonial hall, could portend unwanted power shifts. “On the one hand, they are always emphasizing that superstition is bad,” said Wuyue Sanren. “On the other hand, they have a constant sense of dread.”

But perhaps the most succinct response to the water bottle ballyhoo came again on Reddit, from a user who ridiculed the state media fixation on nostalgia and emotion: “Classic propaganda apparatus,” they wrote. “Moved by its own storytelling.”

Unmasking China’s Ranking Rejection

Chinese state-run outlets in Hong Kong have launched a coordinated response against Reporters Without Borders after it ranked Hong Kong at 140 on its 2025 World Press Freedom Index — downgrading the city to its “very serious” category for the first time. The Ta Kung Pao (大公報) criticized RSF for “distorting facts” and “misrepresenting the truth,” while the Wen Wei Po (文匯報) claimed RSF views Hong Kong through an “ideological lens” that deliberately magnifies isolated cases. Meanwhile, pro-establishment lawmaker Elizabeth Quat (葛珮帆) accused RSF of “double standards,” citing a survey by the Bauhinia Institute (紫荊研究院) claiming 62.5 percent of Hong Kong residents believe the Basic Law (基本法) effectively protects press freedom.

Citing this source may actually support RSF’s basic concerns, however. The Bauhinia Institute, founded in 2016, is closely associated with the central government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong. The company’s director and 100 percent shareholder is Zhang Chunsheng (張春生), a former Xinhua News Agency journalist who later joined Wen Wei Po and for many years was a top executive at the central government-run Bauhinia magazine.

RSF defended its methodology, noting that at least 28 journalists have been prosecuted and 10 remain detained since the implementation of national security legislation in 2020.

Telling China’s Story in Paris

Founded in 2015 by Chen Shiming (陳世明), a restaurant owner turned media entrepreneur, France-based Mandarin TV (歐視TV) — rebranded in 2021 from “French Chinese TV” (法國華人衛視) — makes little effort to disguise its ambition to serve the agenda of the Chinese state. The outlet describes its mission as “spreading China’s voice, telling China’s story well” (傳播中國聲音,講好中國故事) — language that mirrors the goal for external propaganda set out by Xi Jinping in August 2013, less than two years before Chen’s media outfit set up shop in Paris’s 8th Arrondissement.

In interviews with Chinese media, Chen has said he hopes his station can counteract what he says are deeply biased views toward China in France, his home for the past four decades. “I want to show the real China to the French,” he told the Yueqing Daily (樂清日報), a county-level CCP-run newspaper in coastal Zhejiang province. The real China for Chen is apparently reflected by the country’s strictly controlled state-run media. As Chen himself acknowledged in a 2021 interview, the channel openly collaborates with central CCP media like China Central Television (中央電視臺) and China Radio International (中國國際廣播電臺), both under the China Media Group conglomerate directed by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. The channel has also cooperated with regional state broadcasters like Wenzhou TV (溫州電視臺).

Founded by through Chen’s C-MEDIA Group (歐洲中誼文化傳媒集團), and claiming to be the only Chinese-language television station authorized by France’s media regulator Arcom, the station broadcasts 24-hour content, almost entirely from its Chinese state partners. The same state content, including from CCTV and Xinhua News Agency, fills its YouTube channel.

Mandarin TV founder Chen Shiming (left). SOURCE: Mandarin TV.

A Loyal Megaphone on Labor

May 1 is a red-letter day for the Chinese Communist Party, which continues to see worker’s rights as at the heart of its identity and legitimacy — even, or especially, in a period when well-paying jobs are in short supply and workers are over-qualified. International Labor Day this year also marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (中华全国总工会), a vehicle for strengthening proletarian unity and a CCP power base in the Party’s early days. The anniversary celebrations on April 28 made the front page of the People’s Daily, with Xi Jinping making a speech about how the federation had been able to “unite and mobilize the working class to follow in the Party’s steps.”

A portrait of Chairman Mao Zedong working at his desk in 1964, with calligraphy showing “工人日報” (Worker’s Daily) displayed prominently above. This image was originally photographed in 1964 and later published in the newspaper in 1965. SOURCE: All-China Journalist’s Association.

One way they have tried to do so is through their newspaper, the Worker’s Daily (工人日报). From the first days after its launch in July 1949, the outlet aimed to serve an audience of blue-collar laborers not used to the heavy ideological prose of the People’s Daily. Then-head of the Federation, Li Lisan (李立三) — who had spent his early days as a labor organizer in China’s coal mines — imagined a newspaper that could better guide workers on Party thinking by being relatable. Xinhua bulletins, for example, were re-written for the paper in simpler Chinese, with authors selected from among workers across the country.

Relatable propaganda is an idea Xi Jinping has tried to resurrect from the earliest days of his presidency. “Wherever readers are, wherever viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles,” he told an audience at the PLA Daily in 2015. Like the rest of state media, Worker’s Daily has rolled out a news app and accounts on everyday Chinese apps like Douyin, posting videos of heart-warming stories about the toils of modern blue-collar workers across the country.

A Tattle Page for Taiwan

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (國務院台灣事務辦公室), a ministerial-level agency focused on pressing China’s territorial claims and often involved in disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan, launched a new website column on March 26, 2025, encouraging people to report “Taiwan independence” (台獨) activities. Later the same afternoon, Chinese state media reported that the snitch page — essentially an attempt at participatory propaganda — had received 323 reports from the public, including accusations against Liu Shih-fang (劉世芳), Taiwan’s interior minister, and a number of legislators for the country’s Democratic Progressive Party.

According to a report by Taiwan’s United Daily News (UDN), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher Chen Guiqing (陳桂清) warned that “Taiwan independence thugs” would face the mainland’s “powerful anti-independence punch” while criticizing President Lai’s actions as promoting “anti-Chinese sentiment.”