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Country Profile

Italy

Italy’s media landscape faces challenges from the concentration of media ownership and mounting legal pressures on journalists, while Chinese-language outlets serving the 311,000-strong diaspora often maintain documented ties to Chinese state-affiliated media. China engages with the media and information space through content-sharing agreements with major Italian news organizations and regular diplomatic engagement, against a backdrop of greater caution on Italy’s part toward China’s geostrategic ambitions (such as Belt and Road) as it keeps diplomatic and trade channels open.

| Dalia Parete

Sinosphere

According to numbers from Italy’s Ministry of Labor and Social Policies, the Chinese community in the country approached 300,000 in 2023, while the latest figures from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Italy’s main public office for statistics, recorded 311,250 Chinese residents in 2025. The majority of these Chinese, arriving with a surge of migration since the 1990s, are from Wenzhou, the southern coastal city in Zhejiang province, and from the inland counties of Qingtian and Wencheng.

The first wave of Chinese migration to Italy occurred between 1850 and 1915, with most arrivals coming to the Peninsula as students, diplomats, and sailors. The census in 1911, the year the Qing dynasty was toppled, recorded just 45 Chinese nationals in Italy. This number included both diplomats residing in Rome, part of the first Chinese delegation arriving in 1902, and Chinese students studying at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” — or Chinese College in Naples — the university founded in 1732 by the Italian priest Matteo Ripa, who had been a missionary in China from 1711 to 1723, spending time at the court of the Kangxi Emperor. The University of Naples “L’Orientale” describes itself as the oldest school of Sinology in Europe.

In the 1920s, a second wave of Chinese immigrants reached the northern cities of Milan and Turin, where many reportedly worked as street vendors selling fake pearls, according to media coverage from that time. Taking notice of these arrivals, the Italian newspaper La Stampa published an article describing a “Pearl Invasion” and characterizing these vendors as “a series of small, yellow-faced men.” By 1936, the number of Chinese recorded as living in Italy was just 539.

During Italy’s Fascist regime under Benito Mussolini (1922-1943), migration flows slowed, discouraged in part by strict immigration laws introduced in 1931, and laws prohibiting interracial marriage that followed in 1938. In 1940, Mussolini signed a law mandating prisons for the incarceration of foreigners living in Italy and deemed “enemies of the state,” which resulted in an estimated 150 Chinese being imprisoned in the region of Abruzzo, along the east-central coast. These detainees were not released until after the signing of the Armistice of Cassibile with the Allies in September 1943.

The third and most substantial wave of immigration from China to Italy in terms of numbers and impact began after the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policy in 1978. The 1990s in particular brought a surge in Chinese migration, especially as the establishment of a formal immigration framework in Italy offered legal status. By 1994, 95 percent of the estimated 165,000 Chinese migrants coming from the city of Wenzhou alone were living in just four European countries, including Italy.

Most Chinese migrants settled in Milan, Prato, Rome, and Bologna, finding work in restaurants, retail, and the fashion industry. Among these cities, the history of the Chinese community in Milan runs deepest. Paolo Sarpi Street, sometimes referred to as Milan’s Chinatown, has been home to Chinese residents since the 1920s, making it one of Europe’s oldest Chinese enclaves. As of 2025, around 40,000 Chinese had settled in Milan.

Further south, in the Tuscan city of Prato, focused on the textile industry, the Chinese community has become more specialized by industry and more entrepreneurship-focused. In 1989, just 38 Chinese were registered in the city. For a number of years into the 1990s, migrants took entry-level jobs in the city’s textile industry before transitioning to operating factories of their own. “After working in the Italian factories for a while,” one Chinese business owner in Prato told People’s Daily in a 2024 profile, “[the community] realized it wasn’t difficult to operate such factories.” By 2019, one in three businesses registered with Prato’s Chamber of Commerce was migrant-owned. As of 2024, the Chinese diaspora community made up more than a quarter of the city’s total population.

In Rome, meanwhile, the Chinese community, concentrated in the Esquilino, Prenestino and Casilino neighborhoods, comprised around 17,500 residents by 2024. Esquilino’s Piazza Vittorio has become known as the city’s “Chinatown.” The community works mainly in the service sector, including restaurants, grocery stores and beauty salons.

A number of Chinese-language news outlets purport to serve the community, though these frequently have strong affinities, and even contractual cooperation, with state-run outlets from China — including in several cases China News Service (CNS), which is under the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department. Among this latter group is the Rome-based bilingual magazine Cina in Italia (世界中國), founded in 2001 as Life (生活). Its mission, according to its founder, was to help members of the Chinese diaspora navigate legal and social integration issues in Italy. The outlet, published in both Chinese and Italian, is now regarded as the Italian edition of China Newsweek (中國新聞週刊), the flagship magazine of CNS. Another outlet, the Milan-based European Chinese News (歐洲華人報), founded by a Wenzhou-born entrepreneur, chiefly republishes content from CNS. In the broadcasting sector, China FM (華夏之聲), founded in Spain, broadcasts in Milan, Florence, Turin, and Rome. For more on Chinese-language outlets in the country, see the dedicated section further down.

Climate and Challenges 

When the Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini came to power more than a century ago, in 1922, media regarded as critical or unfavorable were systematically brought under state control. Under a series of laws called “Leggi Fascistissime” in 1925 and 1926, all newspapers were required to undergo a political review, giving the regime direct control of the press. The daily work of censorship was overseen by Mussolini’s Ministry of Popular Culture, extending state control over the press, radio, cinema, and theater.

After the fall of the Fascist regime in 1943, the process of rebuilding Italy’s media system unfolded alongside the democratic transition, with the 1948 Constitution offering a constitutional guarantee of press freedom in the form of Article 21, which stated that “anyone has the right to freely express their thoughts in speech, writing, or any other form of communication,” and that “the press may not be subjected to any authorization or censorship.” These guarantees, however, were conditioned to some extent the same year by the Press Law, in which Article 13 — together with Articles 595–597 of the Criminal Code — made defamation through the press punishable by prison sentences of up to six years. Defamation fears stood as a deterrent to more critical press coverage under these laws well into the 21st century, one of the most famous examples being the 1978 case of L’Espresso investigative journalist Camilla Cederna, whose book alleging acts of corruption by President Giovanni Leone was ordered to be destroyed. It was not until 2021 that the Italian Constitutional Court declared that prison sentences for press defamation were unconstitutional.

According to the measures applied by the independent press freedom advocacy organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Italy’s media environment is less free and less favorable to journalists than many of its counterparts in the EU27. In RSF’s 2026 World Press Freedom Index, Italy was in the top third (56th) globally among the 180 countries ranked, down from 49th in 2025, but was 22nd among EU27 countries, ahead of only Malta, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus and Greece.

Media in Italy continue to face multiple challenges, chief among which are media ownership concentration and political partisanship. The Reuters Institute’s 2025 Digital News Report found trust in the news in Italy reaching just 36 percent, below the average of 40 percent among the 48 countries surveyed, and compared to trust above 50 percent in countries including Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands. The same Reuters Institute study found that social media platforms, particularly Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, have become primary news sources for Italians.

Concentration of media ownership remains one of the biggest problems facing the Italian media ecosystem. Since the mid-1980s, the state broadcaster Radio Audizioni Italiane (RAI) and the holding company Fininvest have formed a television duopoly that has dominated the Italian broadcasting landscape. This hyperconcentration was reinforced with the 2004 Gasparri Law, the name commonly used to refer to the country’s broadcast law. The law allows single companies to control multiple media outlets, reinforcing the already existing media concentration in Italy. Most notably, the law enabled media mogul and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to maintain his grip on the private broadcasting market through his Fininvest Group, giving him control over up to 90 percent of Italy’s broadcast media. Even after Berlusconi’s death in 2023, the Berlusconi family continues to control the Fininvest group and, through it, a substantial portion of the Italian media landscape. According to the Reuters Institute, the three largest media groups — RAI, Sky, and Mediaset — together hold roughly 70 percent of total TV revenues, leaving little space for independent media.

As a result of this high degree of concentration, the line between political power and editorial control has rarely been clear in Italy. A 2025 report by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom identified independence from political forces as a key problem in the Italian media space. The relationship between the public broadcaster RAI and the Italian government is illustrative, as the Italian Parliament, controlled by a right-wing majority since 2022, appoints four members of RAI’s board of directors. In May 2024, journalists at RAI staged a one-day strike, protesting what they called “suffocating control over journalistic work, with the attempt to reduce RAI to a government megaphone.” The immediate trigger was the abrupt cancellation of a scheduled monologue by anti-fascist author Antonio Scurati, timed to coincide with Italy’s Liberation Day, where the population commemorates the liberation from fascism. RAI denied that the decision was political. The RAI Journalists’ Union and the International Federation of Journalists condemned the incident.

Beyond the media concentration problem, journalists in Italy also face additional legal pressures. An increasingly common tool used to intimidate journalists has been Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, SLAPPs. The 2025 report from the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE) identified Italy as the EU country with the highest number of documented SLAPPs. These cases are part of a larger, still unresolved defamation challenge facing journalists and media in Italy. While on the one hand, criminal defamation charges have drawn significant criticism from press freedom organizations, civil tort lawsuits — private claims for damages — offer an alternative legal route that has so far drawn less attention. In 2024, former Tourism Minister Daniela Santanchè sued the magazine L’Espresso over investigations into her company’s accounting irregularities over some funds received during the pandemic. The suit was filed under civil tort law, a distinct mechanism from Italy’s criminal defamation statute, and one that remains largely unreformed despite continuous debates over legal intimidation of journalists in the country.

One prominent target of legal action has been journalist Roberto Saviano, author of the organized crime exposé Gomorrah, who has lived under permanent police protection since 2006 following death threats from the Naples-based organized crime organization Camorra. Giorgia Meloni, who became prime minister in 2022, also pursued a criminal defamation suit against Saviano, filed in 2020, for his critical reporting on the government’s stance on migration in Italy, a case that press freedom organizations cited as emblematic of the legal exposure Italian journalists face when reporting on topics the government deems sensitive.

Domestic Chinese-Language Media Outlets

Italy’s Chinese-language media landscape hosts a number of locally established Chinese-language newspapers and periodicals — a reflection of its relatively sizable Chinese population. Look more closely, however, at the media space serving the Chinese diaspora, and direct ties to state media back in China are generally not difficult to establish. In some cases, relationships to the PRC Party-state appear to have grown and deepened at media outlets that began as genuine diaspora voices.

Founded in 2001 under the original title Life (生活), the bilingual magazine Cina in Italia (世界中國) claims that it was intended as a practical guide for Chinese immigrants in Italy. The magazine underwent a significant transformation in 2007 when it became bilingual, publishing in both Italian and Chinese, and changed its title, at which time it also broadened its audience to include government officials and diplomats. Since 2010, Cina in Italia has been publishing in cooperation with China Newsweek (中國新聞週刊), a news magazine under the official diaspora-oriented China News Service (CNS) of the United Front Work Department. The publication publishes articles about Italian and Chinese relations, Chinese politics, and culture.

Another bilingual publication is Cinitalia (中意), a magazine founded in 2012 by the Italian Section of China Radio International (中國國際廣播電臺), or CRI, the radio arm of the China Media Group, under the direct guidance of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. The magazine presents itself as the “only official bilingual magazine for institutions in China and Italy,” and it covers politics, economy, and culture.

In the broadcasting realm, there is China FM (華夏之聲). The radio station was founded in January 2017 in Madrid by journalist Ding Dawei (丁大偉), who arrived in Spain in 2010 as a Madrid correspondent for the Chinese Communist Party newspaper People’s Daily. China FM, which Ding described as “a mouthpiece for the Chinese community,” also has partnerships with Party outlets like CRI, People’s Daily, and China Central Television. The brand expanded to Italy in 2018 when Wenzhou-born entrepreneur Giulio Sun (孫運之), through his company Italia International Radio & Media (IIRM), launched broadcasts in Milan, Turin, Rome and Florence. In 2019, when Sun was interviewed by the Zhejiang Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, he described the station as a broadcasting tool for “China’s good voice” in Italy.

The lack of independent Chinese-language media in Italy reflects what journalist Giulia Pompili describes as a strong direct influence from China within diaspora communities: “In Italy, it often seems that the large Chinese diaspora is already closely aligned with the Chinese Communist Party [...] the Party already maintains a strong influence over diaspora groups, and pro-China content is known to dominate the media that are present.”

Lines of PRC Impact & Engagement 

Italy and China established formal diplomatic relations in 1970. In the decades that followed, the relationship between the two countries has continued to grow, culminating in 2004 with the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Italy joined the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi Jinping’s infrastructure initiative, in 2019, becoming the only G7 country to do so. However, in 2023, the right-wing government of Giorgia Meloni withdrew from the arrangement, given the underwhelming economic results for Italy. Even amid the shaky state of relations between the two countries in 2023, bilateral ties have been growing, especially in foreign direct investment.

Soft Ties and Sympathies 

China has leaned on its relationship with Italy, drawing on a shared history. When Italy signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative in 2019, Chinese state media described the country as “follow(ing) the footsteps of Marco Polo,” and the media have kept returning to the same narrative since. In 2024, Global Times published an article invoking Polo’s Silk Road journey as proof of a “time-honored” bond between the two countries.

The actual relation between the two countries, while growing, has been far less steady than the Chinese state media framing suggests. In December 2023, when Italy formally exited the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese state media met the withdrawal with near-total silence, signaling that relations between the two countries needed to be fixed. The next year, in fact, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni traveled to Beijing on her first official visit, pledging to “relaunch” ties and hailing China as an “important interlocutor” on global tensions. The visit was framed by Xi Jinping around the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership and the 700th anniversary of Marco Polo’s death. Months later, Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella made a state visit to Beijing, signaling Italy’s willingness to smooth relations. Mattarella met with Xi, who said the Sino-Italian partnership should “carry forward the tradition of openness and inclusiveness.”

China’s media ambitions in Italy seem to have followed the same trajectory as the Belt and Road Initiative itself. In 2019, in fact, the state broadcaster RAI and one of Italy’s leading news agencies, ANSA, signed bilateral agreements with China Media Group, a state-backed group, and the official Chinese state agency Xinhua. Both agreements ensured that content from Chinese state media would be circulated in the Italian media.

However, the Italian Institute for International Affairs noted that this increased exposure didn’t lead to a more positive perception of China among Italians. As with the BRI, the media partnerships proved difficult to sustain: ANSA ended its partnership with Xinhua in 2022, after which Xinhua shifted to Agenzia Nova, a smaller online outlet.

Hard Approaches

In recent years, the PRC has worked to foster closer relationships with media in Italy through two primary means. The first and most prominent strategy is direct state engagement with media organizations and their leadership.

This has included: regular interactions between Italian media figures and PRC diplomatic representatives, such as meetings and public events hosted by the Chinese Embassy and Consulate, which serve as platforms for relationship-building and message coordination; and training and capacity-building initiatives, where Chinese officials invite Chinese-language media professionals in Italy to participate in seminars and training sessions, aiming to strengthen professional ties and promote unified messaging.

The second strategy focuses on collaboration between PRC state media and Italian-language outlets. This includes joint visits, training programs, and content-sharing agreements. For example, in December 2017, Italian news agency AdnKronos and Xinhua News Agency (新華社) signed a cooperation agreement during the fourth World Internet Conference (世界互聯網大會) in Wuzhen, covering news exchange and video production. In March 2019, the state-run Economic Daily (經濟日報) and Italian business newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore signed a cooperation agreement in Rome to publish “Focus on China: China Economic Special” (聚焦中國·中國經濟特刊). The collaboration drew criticism when Il Sole 24 Ore journalists denounced the four-page advertorials as “pure propaganda” that promoted Chinese investment without transparent disclosure.

For examples of cooperation and engagement between China and Italian media and media-related organizations, see our Activity Reports for Italy.


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